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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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TIMOTHY TYRONE FOSTER, :

Petitioner : No. 14-8349

v. :

BRUCE CHATMAN, WARDEN. :

- - - - - x

Washington, D.C.
Monday, November 2, 2015

The above-entitled matter came on for oral argument before the Supreme Court of the United States at 10:04 a.m.

APPEARANCES:

STEPHEN B. BRIGHT, ESQ., Atlanta, Ga.; on behalf of
Petitioner. Appointed by this Court.

BETH A. BURTON, ESQ., Deputy Attorney General, Atlanta,
Ga.; on behalf of Respondent.

	C O N T E N T S	
1		
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	PAGE
3	STEPHEN B. BRIGHT, ESQ.	
4	On behalf of the Petitioner	3
5	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	
6	BETH A. BURTON, ESQ.	
7	On behalf of the Respondent	28
8	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF	
9	STEPHEN B. BRIGHT, ESQ.	
10	On behalf of the Petitioner	59
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1
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P R O C E E D I N G S

(10:04 a.m.)

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 14-8349, Foster v. Chatman.

Mr. Bright.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF MR. STEPHEN B. BRIGHT

ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MR. BRIGHT: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:

The prosecutors in this case came to court on the morning of jury selection determined to strike all the black prospective jurors.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Bright, maybe you could address first the -- the question we raised on Friday with respect to which court certiorari should be directed to.

MR. BRIGHT: Yes, Your Honor.

We filed this petition originally certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia. And of course this Court in Sears v. Upton had issued certiorari -- this is in 2010 -- to the Supreme Court of Georgia in a similar situation.

It appears to us, from looking at this over the weekend, that R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. Durham County, which the Court has decided in eight --

1 in 1986, the Court said that, unless there was positive
2 assurance that the decision was not a ruling on the
3 merits, then the writ went to the State supreme court.

4 And the Georgia court, while it has rules
5 and statutes and its own opinions that are not totally
6 in harmony with one another, the rule, nonetheless, is
7 that a certificate of probable cause, which is what was
8 denied in this case, is to be granted if there is
9 arguable merit to the case.

10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Do you think that
11 affects the scope of our review? In other words, are we
12 addressing just whether there's arguable merit to the
13 claim or are we addressing the claim on its own merits?

14 MR. BRIGHT: Well, I -- I think what this
15 Court has done in -- in all these cases is apply *Yist v.*
16 *Nunnemaker* to look through to the last reasoned
17 decision, and that would be the decision of the habeas
18 corpus court. In Georgia, typically the habeas court
19 rules, an application is made for certificate of
20 probable cause to the Georgia Supreme Court, and that is
21 often denied summarily. It is denied summarily as it
22 was in this case. It was denied.

23 JUSTICE SCALIA: I really don't understand
24 that. You -- you say we would be reversing the Georgia
25 Supreme Court, not the -- not the habeas court, right?

1 And -- and all that the Georgia Supreme Court held is
2 that there -- there -- is that there was no arguable
3 basis for -- for its accepting review.

4 So if we reverse that decision, we -- we
5 tell the Georgia Supreme Court, you're wrong; there is
6 an arguable basis for your accepting review. So we
7 ought to remand to that court, requiring them to accept
8 review, it would seem to me.

9 How can we reverse them on -- on an issue
10 they -- they never considered?

11 MR. BRIGHT: Well, that's what happened in
12 R.J. Reynolds. I mean, there you had almost an
13 identical situation where you had an intermediate
14 appellate court that had ruled, and then you had the
15 North Carolina Supreme Court denied review. And the
16 question was, do you issue the writ to the intermediate
17 appellate court or to the North Carolina Supreme Court?
18 And -- and this Court decided, and Justice Blackman,
19 writing for the court, said, "We want to give
20 practitioners" -- "We want to end the confusion about
21 this."

22 And so it goes to the State supreme court.

23 There is no difference in our situation here
24 and the situation that R.J. Reynolds --

25 JUSTICE KAGAN: But -- but you're saying in

1 that case or in other cases? And if so, which other
2 cases that, in that situation, we, nonetheless,
3 addressed the reasoning of the intermediate court? Is
4 that what you're saying?

5 MR. BRIGHT: You -- you did in *Sears v.*
6 *Upton*, a case out of Georgia, 561 U.S. 945 in 2010.
7 That was certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia, but
8 it came up on exactly the same posture of our -- our
9 case.

10 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is there an argument that
11 the petition for certiorari could go to the trial court?

12 I mean, our statute says that it goes to the
13 highest court in which review could have -- could have
14 been had, I think is the -- the statutory phrase, in
15 which sounds like the Georgia Supreme Court.

16 On the other hand, as Justice Scalia said,
17 they haven't really directed their attention to the
18 issues before us.

19 I -- I -- I'm not sure to me that it's an
20 option to -- to go to the superior -- to the Georgia
21 trial court.

22 MR. BRIGHT: Well, let --

23 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Or -- or is that
24 incorrect?

25 MR. BRIGHT: Well, what this Court has said,

1 both in the R.J. Reynolds case and then that was
2 followed in Grady v. North Carolina last year -- 2015
3 case, this year, in which, once again, there was an
4 intermediate court decision denied by the -- the North
5 Carolina Supreme Court.

6 I mean, I can remember all the way back to
7 1960. There was Thompson v. Louisville, where
8 certiorari was to the police court in Louisville,
9 Kentucky, because no court in Kentucky could take the
10 case because the fine was less than \$20.

11 But I think these cases, much more recent,
12 decided by the Court 1986 and this year --

13 JUSTICE GINSBURG: You're putting together
14 two rules that you say we've established. One is
15 Justice Blackman said, to end the confusion, the
16 petition should be addressed to the Supreme Court.

17 And then you said, we have cases. Look
18 through cases. If --

19 MR. BRIGHT: Right.

20 JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- the Supreme Court has
21 said just "denied," nothing more than "denied," we look
22 back to the last reasoned decision.

23 Those are both decisions of this Court, and
24 that's what you're relying on.

25 MR. BRIGHT: Well, and -- and they're not

1 mutually exclusive. This Court can look back through to
2 the last reasoned decision in making its decision in
3 this case, and I believe that's what it should do. But
4 at the same time, the Court's opinions appear to us, on
5 the quick research we did over the weekend on this, that
6 R.J. Reynolds and -- and the subsequent case say that
7 certiorari would issue to the Georgia Supreme Court.

8 And -- and we listed it that way, and then
9 when the case was docketed here, it was listed that the
10 lower court was the superior court of Butts County.

11 JUSTICE ALITO: What if the State supreme
12 court wrote a short opinion and said, We're not going to
13 determine whether there was, in fact -- the only issue
14 we're going to determine is whether there's any arguable
15 merit to this? And then you say that the whole issue of
16 whether it was a correct application in Batson is -- is
17 the issue that we have to decide?

18 MR. BRIGHT: I -- I -- I think in
19 R.J. Reynolds, I think that's this Court's law, yes.

20 JUSTICE ALITO: Could I ask you another -- a
21 question about another preliminary issue before you get
22 to the -- the -- the underlying question in the case?

23 The Superior Court said, on page 175 of the
24 Joint Appendix, that the issue of the Batson violation
25 was not reviewable based on the doctrine of

1 res judicata.

2 And then it later said, and this is 192 of
3 the Joint Appendix, that it will review the Batson claim
4 as to whether Petitioner has shown any change in the
5 facts sufficient to overcome the res judicata bar.

6 Now, if you put those two together, you
7 could argue that the superior court decided only a
8 question of State law, namely, whether the situation
9 here was such that there could be review of the Batson
10 claim.

11 What is your response to that?

12 MR. BRIGHT: Well, the State doesn't argue
13 that. And I think the reason for that is because the
14 Court said, we're moving -- the Court is going to
15 address step three of Batson. And it said, Foster's
16 Batson claim is without merit.

17 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, but is it question
18 of Federal or State law as to whether or not the
19 Petitioner has shown a change in facts sufficient to
20 overcome the res judicata bar? The one -- the page 192
21 language that Justice Alito quoted, is that -- is that a
22 State law question or --

23 MR. BRIGHT: That's a State law question.

24 And here --

25 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well --

1 MR. BRIGHT: -- the Court decided it, but
2 I -- I point out, Justice --

3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, if it's a State law
4 question and they resolved it against you, what do you
5 have to -- then what do you have to argue?

6 MR. BRIGHT: No, no, no.

7 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I think you have to say
8 it's a Federal question.

9 MR. BRIGHT: No. In order to decide it,
10 the -- this is exactly like *Ake v. Oklahoma*, where the
11 court, the Oklahoma court had to decide the Federal
12 question in order to decide whether it had jurisdiction
13 over the issue.

14 And this Court held in *Ake* that, where the
15 court has to decide the Federal issue -- and it did in
16 this case. It clearly decided the Federal issue and
17 felt that the -- found that the *Batson* claim had no
18 merit. So it is decided, the Federal issue, and there's
19 no contest about that in the --

20 JUSTICE SCALIA: Explain to me why deciding
21 the Federal issue was essential to its deciding the
22 State *res judicata* issue.

23 MR. BRIGHT: Because it -- it -- it framed
24 the question as being that it would look at the
25 *Ake v.* -- excuse me -- they would look at the *Batson v.*

1 Kentucky claim and that, if there was merit to that
2 claim, then the court would grant the writ on it. On
3 the other hand, if it found that there was not merit on
4 it, then --

5 JUSTICE SCALIA: There -- you think it was
6 saying whether there's res judicata or not depends on
7 whether the new claim has any merit?

8 MR. BRIGHT: I think -- I think it's
9 exactly --

10 JUSTICE SCALIA: That's a very strange
11 application of res judicata, it seems to me.

12 MR. BRIGHT: Well --

13 JUSTICE SCALIA: I thought it was whether
14 there -- there were changed facts sufficient enough.

15 MR. BRIGHT: Well, the Georgia law is that
16 you can bring an issue that's been litigated already
17 before direct appeal.

18 JUSTICE SCALIA: Right. Right.

19 MR. BRIGHT: In habeas, if there are --

20 JUSTICE SCALIA: Even -- even -- right.
21 Even if it would, you know, produce a different result,
22 right?

23 MR. BRIGHT: Right. If the -- if the facts
24 are such that it would produce a different result,
25 right.

1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Bright, did the
2 court, in your judgment, do de novo review? Didn't it
3 say that it did -- basically, it was going to do step
4 three of the Batson charge -- challenge?

5 MR. BRIGHT: Yes, that's exactly what the
6 court said, yes.

7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So that's a ruling on
8 the merits.

9 MR. BRIGHT: I think -- I think the court
10 said the Batson claim is without merit. That seems like
11 a ruling on the merits to me.

12 (Laughter.)

13 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, it -- I think it
14 said after -- after redoing --

15 MR. BRIGHT: After considering these other
16 facts. And we think there was some legal errors made
17 there. But yes, after considering these facts, the
18 court said that the claim was without merit.

19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: The court said that it
20 would reach step three again on the basis of the new
21 evidence presented, and so they did it all over. And I
22 guess that's -- we must take that as what happened.
23 They did not apply a res judicata bar.

24 MR. BRIGHT: No. I mean, in Ake this Court
25 said, when the resolution of the State procedural law

1 question depends upon a Federal constitutional ruling,
2 the State law prong is not independent of the Federal
3 claim. And this Court has jurisdiction. That's on page
4 75 of 47 United States.

5 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, I don't want to
6 belabor the point too much, but you -- are you arguing
7 that Georgia res judicata law is this: If someone comes
8 up with any new fact, the -- the -- the thinnest new
9 fact, that is sufficient to wipe out the res judicata
10 bar and allow the court to get to the merits of the
11 claim? Is that your argument? That's your
12 understanding of Georgia res judicata law?

13 MR. BRIGHT: That's not my understanding.
14 My understanding is the evidence has to be sufficient
15 enough that the court does what it did in this case and
16 rule on the merits of the issue. And that's what
17 happened here. This was not a matter of just adding one
18 more leaf to the basket.

19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And we really want you to
20 get to the merits, but why is that -- in conjunction
21 with --

22 MR. BRIGHT: We will.

23 JUSTICE KENNEDY: -- with Justice Scalia's
24 question, why is that an issue of Federal law?

25 MR. BRIGHT: Because the court decided the

1 Batson issue to decide the underlying State law issue.
2 And I think Ake is pretty clear on this, and I commend
3 it to the Court's attention. We didn't -- it wasn't --
4 since the State had raised this, either in their
5 opposition to cert or in their brief, it's not briefed
6 before this Court, but I think that's the deciding case
7 on this.

8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thanks, counsel. I
9 think we have your argument on the point. Thank you.

10 MR. BRIGHT: Okay. Thank you very much.

11 If I could just say what happened here was
12 that the prosecutors had identified the
13 African-Americans by race, they had rated them against
14 each other in case it came down to having to select a
15 black juror.

16 JUSTICE GINSBURG: The prosecutors said the
17 reason for concentrating on the black jurors was that
18 you had informed them you would present a Batson
19 challenge, and therefore, it was necessary for them to
20 see if there was a race-neutral ground for disqualifying
21 that case.

22 MR. BRIGHT: Right. Two answers to that,
23 Justice Ginsburg.

24 I mean, what the lawyers did here was these
25 lawyers have practiced here for a long time in Rome,

1 Georgia. They said the prosecutor always strikes all
2 the blacks from the jury. That's been the historic
3 practice. We think they're going to strike all the
4 blacks on the jury in our case. But last year the
5 Supreme Court of the United States decided Batson v.
6 Kentucky, and we asked the Court not to let that happen
7 in this case.

8 Now, of course, if the prosecutor is willing
9 to avoid a Batson challenge, they could have not
10 discriminated. That would have been the first thing to
11 do.

12 But -- but secondly, with regard to the
13 information that's collected here, it doesn't seem like
14 it's information just to exercise strikes when they say,
15 if it comes down to having to take an African-American,
16 Ms. Hardge, or in another place, Ms. Garrett, might be
17 okay. And the district attorney himself said Marilyn
18 Garrett has the most potential of the black prospective
19 jurors.

20 In other words, the blacks were taken out of
21 the picture here. They were taken and -- and dealt with
22 separately. And over the weekend, the jury -- the
23 questioning ended on a Friday. And the judge said, all
24 right. Over the weekend, you've got your chance to
25 decide who you're going to strike. And they knew

1 exactly who they were going to strike because the --
2 the -- the jurors are listed in order. The State goes
3 first, and if it accepts a juror, then the State
4 accepts, and that juror is on. There's no going back.
5 There's no backstriking or there's no striking people
6 here and there.

7 They developed three strike lists. And one
8 of those strike lists was a list headed "Definite NOs."
9 These are the people absolutely are not going to be on
10 this jury. There are only six jurors listed on the list
11 of "Definite NOs," and the first five are
12 African-Americans. The sixth is a juror who made clear
13 during the voir dire process that she could not impose
14 the death penalty under any circumstances. The State
15 moved to strike her for cause. The judge probably erred
16 in not granting that strike. But even she ranked behind
17 the black jurors in terms of the priorities that the
18 prosecution had for -- for striking.

19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, at this --

20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Bright --

21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- at the time,
22 Mr. Lanier said they weren't striking the -- the jurors
23 because of race. They were striking them because they
24 were women. And I guess three -- three out of the
25 four --

1 (Laughter.)

2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- African-Americans
3 were -- who were struck were -- were women. How does
4 that -- and then that explanation is just kind of fallen
5 out of the case.

6 How -- how does that affect the analysis?

7 MR. BRIGHT: Well, he -- he did accept
8 women, though, as -- as well. If -- bear with me a --
9 just a moment.

10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: The Court had not yet
11 held that Batson applies to --

12 MR. BRIGHT: The Court had not held in JEB
13 that Batson applied to women, but the Court did say in
14 JEB that, of course, it could be used as a pretext,
15 women, for striking on the basis of race.

16 In this case, the prosecutor struck three
17 white jurors, and then he struck the three black jurors,
18 women, the three black women and the three white women.
19 The final --

20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. -- Mr. Bright,
21 Mr. Lanier --

22 MR. BRIGHT: Yes.

23 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- answered yes when he
24 asked -- when during the -- during the trial when he was
25 asked whether he had done -- I don't know if it -- oh,

1 no, it was on the motion for a new trial hearing --
2 whether he had done the same extensive background check
3 on all the jurors, white and black.

4 Did you find any evidence of that extensive
5 black background search?

6 MR. BRIGHT: No. The only -- what that's
7 talking about -- and -- and the investigator said this
8 in his deposition, was the color -- race-coded colored
9 list, those first four lists you have in the Joint
10 Appendix in which the blacks are marked with a "B" and
11 are highlighted in green with a marker up at the corner
12 saying green designates black.

13 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So -- so your -- your
14 understanding of that statement was that all -- he had
15 only done an extensive search on the blacks on the list?

16 MR. BRIGHT: Well, it's clear, Mr. Lundy had
17 prepared a -- a list, notes in which he talked about
18 just the black jurors in -- in the case. And I think
19 the State concedes in its brief that the focus was on
20 the black jurors.

21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: During the trial, did
22 defense counsel, when he made his initial Batson
23 challenge -- not in the papers, but at trial -- did he
24 again say that this was part and parcel of the
25 prosecutor's pattern?

1 MR. BRIGHT: He didn't say that, but I point
2 this interesting thing out. When they discussed the
3 Batson motion before trial, there was never a suggestion
4 that there wouldn't be a Batson hearing. Everybody knew
5 what was going to happen, that all the blacks would be
6 struck, and then they'd have a hearing after that
7 happened. But the defense had basically put their
8 motion in writing and relied upon that throughout the
9 jury selection.

10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I was just surprised
11 that we didn't hear about this preparation for a Batson
12 hearing until --

13 MR. BRIGHT: Well --

14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- the habeas.

15 MR. BRIGHT: The -- the defense lawyers at
16 trial did move for the prosecution's notes. And the
17 prosecution opposed that. They're very strict in not --
18 not giving up their notes. Then when the prosecutor
19 testified on the motion for a new trial, he did
20 something I've never seen a lawyer do before. He cut a
21 bargain, sort of, with the judge and the lawyer saying,
22 I will testify, but only if I don't have to show them my
23 notes.

24 I mean, basic rules of evidence are you
25 testify and rely upon notes; the other side can see the

1 notes. But here, these notes were guarded until 2006,
2 when we obtained them through a Freedom of Information
3 or what they call Open Records Act in Georgia.

4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: The prosecutors said that
5 you -- they said, we never -- we never wrote or
6 authorized or relied on those notes. And you didn't
7 call the prosecutors to test the veracity of that
8 assertion.

9 MR. BRIGHT: No, but all the prosecutor
10 talked about were the color-highlighted notes. Each
11 prosecutor filed an affidavit which are in the -- in the
12 Joint Appendix at 168. And all they said was, we didn't
13 highlight it in green, and we didn't tell anybody else
14 to highlight it in green. And then Mr. Lanier says --
15 and I don't have anything else to say beyond what I said
16 at the Batson hearing and the motion for a new trial.
17 Mr. Pullen said -- the only other thing he said is, I
18 didn't use those green-highlighted lists in choosing the
19 jury; but, of course, that's just the first few pages.

20 What's damning about this is not so much
21 that, but the "Definite NOs" list, the misrepresentation
22 to the trial court that Ms. Garrett -- that they wanted
23 Ms. Garrett. That's what they told the trial court.
24 And the trial court relied upon that in denying the
25 Batson motion, that this showed their openness to

1 having -- Ms. Garrett was on the "Definite NO" list.
2 She was on each of the strike lists. Ms. Garrett was
3 never in the running to be on this jury.

4 But they represented to the court that
5 because another African-American, Shirley Powell, was
6 excused for cause -- there were five African-Americans
7 in the venire at the start when they got ready to
8 instruct the jury. But one said, turns out I know
9 somebody in the family. She was excused for cause. And
10 the prosecutors said -- made it -- implied clearly that
11 had it not been for that, that extra strike, that
12 Ms. Garrett would have sat.

13 At the same time -- and they're still
14 arguing this both ways, that they both wanted her and
15 didn't want her -- they give eleven reasons for why
16 Ms. Garrett would not be a good juror. That she's
17 impudent and she doesn't respect the court. If you
18 believe all the things they said about her, they would
19 never want her as a juror.

20 But those things, I would submit, are not
21 really valid in terms of -- in terms of the reasons,
22 because the reasons they gave here, many were
23 demonstrably false and not supported by the evidence,
24 including reasons they gave about Ms. Garrett. They
25 were inconsistent, some were completely incredible, and

1 they applied to white jurors -- some of these reasons
2 applied to white jurors who had the same characteristics
3 as the African-Americans who were struck.

4 And then lastly, and what's so important
5 under Miller-El, they didn't question the jurors about
6 the reasons for striking them. They gave reasons for
7 striking, and one question would have cleared up some of
8 these. And Miller-El says that the failure to engage in
9 any meaningful voir dire about whatever your reason is,
10 is evidence suggesting that the explanation is a sham
11 and a pretext.

12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Bright --

13 MR. BRIGHT: And --

14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- I have found some
15 circuit courts who have a rule on appeal or on habeas
16 which is if they can find one legitimate reason for
17 striking a juror --

18 MR. BRIGHT: Yes.

19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- that's enough to
20 defeat a Batson challenge. Do you believe that's an
21 appropriate rule? Are you suggesting a different
22 approach to the question?

23 MR. BRIGHT: Well, it can't -- I -- I would
24 suggest it -- it can't possibly be. Because this Court
25 said in Justice Alito's opinion in Snyder v. Louisiana

1 that where the peremptory strike was shown to have been
2 motivated in substantial part by race, that it could not
3 be sustained. And -- excuse me -- I -- I would suggest
4 to you, it shouldn't even really say substantial.
5 Because if this Court, as it said so many times, is
6 engaged in unceasing efforts to end race discrimination
7 in the criminal courts, then a strike that -- strikes
8 motivated by race cannot be tolerable.

9 And, of course, as -- as pointed out here in
10 the -- in the amici, this is a serious problem, not just
11 in this case, but in other cases where people come to
12 court with their canned reasons and just read them off.
13 That happened in this case, where one of the reasons
14 that was given was just taken verbatim out of a -- two
15 of the reasons given were taken verbatim out of a
16 reported case. So you don't have the reason for the
17 lawyer in this case. He said my personal preference.
18 It wasn't his personal preference. It was the personal
19 preference of some U.S. attorney in Mississippi who gave
20 that reason, and then it was upheld on appeal by -- by
21 the Fifth Circuit.

22 But I -- we would suggest that the standard
23 is at least what Snyder says, because when you have
24 both -- you can always have, as Miller-El recognized --

25 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, in -- in response to

1 Justice Sotomayor's question --

2 MR. BRIGHT: Right.

3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: -- if the prosecutor
4 argues a laundry list of reasons for striking the black
5 juror and some of those are reasonable and some are
6 implausible, how should the Court approach the Batson
7 analysis?

8 MR. BRIGHT: I think the Court looks at
9 which reasons are pretextual. I think the fact that
10 there is a laundry list suggests in and of itself that
11 the Court should scrutinize the reasons very carefully,
12 should be suspect of the reasons. Because otherwise,
13 what the Court is going to do is just simply encourage
14 prosecutors or any party in a case, since Batson applies
15 to everyone -- is going to encourage a party to just
16 give as many reasons as possible and hope that one will
17 be acceptable. And in this case --

18 JUSTICE ALITO: Don't you think this is --
19 this is a case-by-case thing? Suppose there's one
20 reason that's a killer reason? Like this -- this
21 individual has numerous prior felony convictions, all
22 right? And then the prosecutor says in addition, and
23 this -- this person didn't -- he looked down at the
24 floor in answering the questions and didn't seem to
25 pause and didn't seem to understand some of the

1 questions.

2 So under a circumstance like that, couldn't
3 the Court say, well, the one -- there's one reason here
4 that would -- that is clearly a justification for a
5 peremptory strike? We don't have to determine whether
6 there's evidence that the person was looking down at the
7 floor.

8 MR. BRIGHT: Well, of course, Batson says,
9 and the subsequent cases say, you look at all relevant
10 circumstances. It may be if all the circumstances that
11 are there, the ones you said, then you would come to the
12 conclusion that of those two reasons that there was a
13 valid reason.

14 But I would suggest that where you have
15 indicia like we have here, I mean, we have an arsenal of
16 smoking guns in this case.

17 JUSTICE SCALIA: A lot of those smoking guns
18 were in the original decisions by -- by the Georgia
19 courts. It seems to me what -- what you would have to
20 establish to reverse the Georgia courts is that the new
21 smoking gun, assuming that all the rest were not enough
22 to demonstrate a Batson violation -- the new smoking
23 guns would tip the scale. Isn't -- isn't that the
24 issue --

25 MR. BRIGHT: Well, when the --

1 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- that the Georgia courts
2 decided?

3 MR. BRIGHT: When the -- when the new
4 smoking gun tells you that the prosecutor misrepresented
5 facts and gave reasons that were absolutely false,
6 demonstrably false reasons, and those are not clear
7 before, but you have that now, I mean, Batson turns on
8 the feasibility of the reasons. It turns on the
9 credibility of the prosecutor.

10 JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes, but all -- all I'm
11 saying -- and you seem to be agreeing -- is that it is
12 not the overall Batson judgment that's before us but
13 rather the judgment that the -- that the new evidence
14 did not suffice to create a Batson violation where none
15 existed before.

16 MR. BRIGHT: No. Our position is that when
17 you look at the new evidence with all the evidence at
18 trial, that all relevant circumstances considered
19 together, considering that a lot of these reasons we now
20 know from the notes, we now know from the notes that
21 there were misrepresentations with regard to these
22 reasons.

23 I mean, the Georgia Supreme Court -- just as
24 an example, Justice Scalia -- upheld the strike on
25 Ms. Garrett on two bases: That she was a social worker

1 and that her cousin had been arrested for drugs. She
2 was not a social worker, and secondly, the prosecutor
3 didn't find out until after trial about her cousin's
4 arrest, so it couldn't have possibly been a reason for
5 the strike.

6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Are you saying in answer
7 to Justice Scalia that when you had the notes, those
8 notes cast doubt on some of the prosecutor's
9 justifications in the first round?

10 MR. BRIGHT: They -- they do that, and --
11 and they show misrepresentations to the court, and they
12 show an overarching goal of separating out the
13 African-American citizens, treating them differently and
14 then putting them on this list of "Definite NOs."

15 JUSTICE KAGAN: And Mr. Bright, just to make
16 sure I understand, all the notes in the prosecutor's
17 files were new; is that right?

18 MR. BRIGHT: New. New to this case, yes.

19 JUSTICE KAGAN: Yes. Okay.

20 MR. BRIGHT: And there were three people:
21 It just involved the two prosecutors and the
22 investigator who put those together.

23 I'd like to reserve the balance of my time.

24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

25 Ms. Burton.

1 ORAL ARGUMENT OF BETH A. BURTON
2 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

3 MS. BURTON: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
4 please the Court:

5 I believe there are two important factors in
6 this case when reviewing the entirety of the evidence.
7 One is Petitioner bears the burden of establishing
8 clear --

9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I -- I'll ask you as
10 well to address the certiorari question first.

11 MS. BURTON: And -- and respectfully, I
12 disagree with Petitioner's counsel on this issue. I
13 believe *Norfolk & Western Railway v. Hiles*, which is
14 this Court's opinion, indicates that -- or states that
15 if there is an issue raised in the lower court and it is
16 raised in the State's highest court, in this case, the
17 Georgia Supreme Court, but the Georgia Supreme Court
18 denies discretionary review, then it is before this
19 Court on certiorari from the lower court. So --

20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, the problem is I
21 don't think this is discretionary review. The Eleventh
22 Circuit found it's not under Georgia law. Read its
23 opinion. It seems pretty grounded in the stated law of
24 Georgia.

25 MS. BURTON: Yes, Your Honor, and that is --

1 that's a pretty hot-button issue I know right now in the
2 State Federal courts in Georgia. But our position in
3 that -- in that -- those cases and in -- I think there
4 was a case before this Court on rehearing on that same
5 issue -- is that Georgia statute -- the Georgia statute
6 specifically says that is a discretionary appeal. The
7 1975 Habeas Corpus Act made it a discretionary appeal, I
8 think, because the Georgia Supreme Court was just
9 getting inundated with appeal after appeal.

10 JUSTICE KAGAN: And has the Georgia Supreme
11 Court ever -- ever said anything one way or the other as
12 to whether it's discretionary or not?

13 MS. BURTON: In two of their cases, Reed v.
14 Hopper, which is 219 S.E.2d 409, and Smith v. Nichols,
15 which is 270 S.E.2d 550, 1999. They both state those as
16 discretionary. But they have not -- they have not
17 answered a -- a certified question on that issue.

18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could you give me the --
19 the Reed v. -- what?

20 MS. BURTON: Yes, Your Honor. 219 S.E.2d
21 409. That's a 1975 case.

22 JUSTICE SCALIA: Are certified questions
23 available in Georgia? Could -- could we certify a
24 question to the Georgia Supreme Court?

25 MS. BURTON: I -- I believe you can, Your

1 Honor.

2 JUSTICE BREYER: You did -- we -- I -- I --
3 we looked at -- I looked at the statute. The statute
4 says in a habeas case, State habeas, that the Georgia
5 Supreme Court must review it. It says it must review it
6 unless it's without merit. I forget the exact words. I
7 was looking for them.

8 MS. BURTON: Well, the -- in State habeas --

9 JUSTICE BREYER: Do they state that?

10 MS. BURTON: Well, in the State habeas, I
11 think it's 9-14-52 --

12 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes.

13 MS. BURTON: -- the statute takes State
14 habeas cases out of other appellate review and makes
15 that just discretionary. The Georgia Supreme Court --

16 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, wait, wait, wait.
17 Then I've been looking at the wrong place.

18 You heard your brother here say -- he quoted
19 some words. I don't remember the exact words, but they
20 were exactly what I'd read, and it was from a statute in
21 Georgia.

22 MS. BURTON: Well, it's --

23 JUSTICE BREYER: And the Georgia statute
24 said -- I just can't find it in my book here. Sorry.
25 The Georgia statute said they shall review the case

1 unless it's without -- it's totally without merit.

2 Something like that.

3 I -- does that ring a bell?

4 MS. BURTON: Well, there is --

5 JUSTICE BREYER: Does it ring a bell, what
6 I'm saying?

7 MS. BURTON: It -- it does ring a bell.

8 JUSTICE BREYER: Or what are the exact
9 words?

10 MS. BURTON: I -- I -- I do not know the
11 exact words. But I believe the --

12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The exact words are
13 that a certificate of probable cause will be issued when
14 there is arguable merit.

15 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes. That's it.

16 MS. BURTON: But I believe that's Rule 36 of
17 the Georgia Supreme Court.

18 JUSTICE BREYER: Right. Right -- that
19 doesn't --

20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I think it's
21 9-14-52. Or if there had been compliance with that,
22 right? Okay.

23 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. Does that govern
24 this case?

25 MS. BURTON: I -- I believe the statute

1 would trump it.

2 JUSTICE BREYER: Does the word that he --
3 that the Chief Justice just read from Georgia law govern
4 this case? The answer is yes or no.

5 MS. BURTON: I -- no, I believe it's
6 discretionary.

7 JUSTICE BREYER: They do not govern this
8 case.

9 MS. BURTON: I believe the State --

10 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. What, in your
11 opinion, is the Georgia statute that says that those
12 words you just held do not govern this case?

13 MS. BURTON: I believe it's -- and -- and
14 correct. I -- I'm certainly open to correction.
15 19-14-52 states that State habeas is taken out of other
16 appeals, which are normally directly appeals, or
17 prisoner appeals, and they are discretionary.

18 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. Thank you.

19 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, I -- I suppose
20 that -- that -- that a court could have a discretionary
21 view but could provide by rule that, in the exercise of
22 our discretion, we will grant any of these unless it's
23 patently wrong.

24 Could -- couldn't -- and -- is -- maybe
25 that's what's happened here. And if -- if you use your

1 discretion to enact a rule which says you will take
2 cases of a certain court, does -- does the taking of
3 those cases still remain discretionary?

4 That's a nice question, isn't it?

5 (Laughter.)

6 MS. BURTON: I think the -- I think the
7 taking of the case does remain discretionary. If they
8 find it has arguable merit, it is discretionary. And --
9 and the two cases I cited specifically reference --

10 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, why would we --

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: You've -- you've just
12 decided that you will uniformly exercise your discretion
13 in a certain way.

14 MS. BURTON: Correct.

15 JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes.

16 JUSTICE KAGAN: But -- but I -- maybe I'm
17 misunderstanding what you're saying. You're saying
18 there is no such uniform determination that they will
19 exercise their discretion in a certain way, that they
20 are insisting upon their discretion being discretionary.
21 Is that correct?

22 (Laughter.)

23 MS. BURTON: That is -- that is my
24 understanding. Because these -- this -- this law
25 applies to not just, obviously, death-only cases but the

1 multitude of non-death-only cases.

2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. I'm so
3 confused I can't even --

4 (Laughter.)

5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The State habeas process
6 is different than the regular appeal process.

7 MS. BURTON: That's correct.

8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: On the regular appeal
9 process, they look at each case -- each case with
10 discretion.

11 MS. BURTON: On a direct appeal process,
12 it -- it -- and certainly a capital case, it is
13 mandatory review.

14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Okay. In State habeas
15 they have a rule, an internal rule that says, we'll take
16 every habeas case unless it's -- has no arguable merit,
17 right?

18 MS. BURTON: I -- if I may rephrase: I
19 think the rule says that they will take a case if it has
20 arguable merit. Generally they would not take --

21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: In the positive.

22 MS. BURTON: Right, right.

23 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what would lend us to
24 believe that they didn't look at the merits and say
25 there was no arguable merit? That they just said, we're

1 too busy. We don't care if there is arguable merit.

2 Do you believe they did that?

3 MS. BURTON: I would never -- I would never
4 say they were too busy to take the case.

5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. What?

6 MS. BURTON: But -- I said I would never say
7 they were too -- that that would be the reason.

8 But I think they would say, we've looked at
9 this case -- because they do have the records before
10 them -- and we don't see arguable merit to take this up.

11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So that is a decision on
12 the merits. There is no arguable merits.

13 MS. BURTON: I think it is a fine -- there
14 is no arguable merit to the application that there has
15 been error below.

16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Okay.

17 MS. BURTON: If that makes it any clearer.

18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Now it's clear.

19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And in your view, cert
20 should have been granted to the Georgia Supreme Court?

21 MS. BURTON: I believe in my -- I believe it
22 should have been granted to the State habeas court
23 because of that discretionary review and because I
24 believe that this Court has said, in Michigan v. Long,
25 that if it's --

1 JUSTICE KENNEDY: All right.

2 MS. BURTON: -- if it's unclear, it comes
3 from the State habeas court.

4 JUSTICE KAGAN: Can I just ask one more
5 quick question about this.

6 MS. BURTON: Sure.

7 JUSTICE KAGAN: You -- you made reference --
8 this is an issue that's being litigated in the Georgia
9 courts, is that right, in the Eleventh Circuit?

10 MS. BURTON: That is correct.

11 JUSTICE KAGAN: This precise issue?

12 MS. BURTON: This -- this issue.

13 JUSTICE KAGAN: Thank you.

14 MS. BURTON: To --

15 JUSTICE SCALIA: What -- what issue is that?

16 MS. BURTON: The --

17 (Laughter.)

18 JUSTICE SCALIA: Is it -- is it the issue of
19 which court the certiorari should be directed to?

20 MS. BURTON: Well, I -- I -- it's -- it's --

21 JUSTICE SCALIA: The issue of what? What is
22 the issue that is being litigated?

23 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, I'll -- I'll -- am I
24 right that the issue that is being litigated is whether
25 the Supreme Court review, in cases like this, is

1 discretionary or not discretionary?

2 MS. BURTON: That is correct.

3 JUSTICE SCALIA: All right.

4 MS. BURTON: And in those cases, obviously,
5 it's coming up from Federal court. So we're dealing
6 more with Elst and Richter -- Harrison -- Harrington v.
7 Richter in -- in a -- in a sort of a different scope of
8 things in that regard.

9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And this question is in
10 both the Georgia Supreme Court and in the Eleventh
11 Circuit?

12 MS. BURTON: It is -- it is currently in the
13 Eleventh Circuit. I don't believe we have a case
14 pending now in the Georgia Supreme Court on that
15 particular issue. But I -- I do believe it's up --
16 there is an issue up here in a case, Jones v. Chatman,
17 where it is they've asked for rehearing --

18 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Do you think this would be
19 an appropriate case for us to exercise our discretion to
20 certify the question to the Supreme Court?

21 MS. BURTON: We would certainly like an
22 answer from the Georgia Supreme Court on that issue. I
23 think -- I think the Eleventh Circuit would like that
24 as -- as well. I think it would clear up both State and
25 Federal law for -- for a number of things.

1 JUSTICE GINSBURG: There's a statute that
2 permits the -- the Georgia Supreme Court to accept
3 certified questions. Do you know anything about the
4 history of requests for certification?

5 Some states have such a process, but the
6 State supreme court rejects the question.

7 MS. BURTON: I do not, Your Honor. And I --
8 I apologize for that.

9 JUSTICE SCALIA: What -- what if we hold in
10 this case that it is not discretionary review, and then,
11 in these cases that are pending, the Georgia Supreme
12 Court says it is discretionary review? Who wins?

13 (Laughter.)

14 JUSTICE SCALIA: Is it ultimately a question
15 for us or for the Georgia Supreme Court?

16 MS. BURTON: I think it's ultimately a
17 question for the Georgia Supreme Court as to what --
18 what their law is, what the State law is.

19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Why?

20 JUSTICE KAGAN: Me too.

21 Can I -- can I go to the merits? Is that --
22 is that all right?

23 MS. BURTON: Sure.

24 JUSTICE KAGAN: Okay. Unless other
25 people --

1 Okay.

2 Look. You have a lot of new information
3 here from these files that suggests that what the
4 prosecutors were doing was looking at the
5 African-American prospective jurors as a group, that
6 they had basically said, we don't want any of these
7 people. Here is the one we want if we really have to
8 take one. But that there -- the -- all the evidence
9 suggests a kind of singling out, which is the very
10 antithesis of the Batson rule.

11 So, you know, I mean -- well, isn't this
12 as -- I'm just going to ask you: Isn't this as clear a
13 Batson violation as a court is ever going to see?

14 MS. BURTON: I don't think it is. And I
15 think, because these notes that we have, they don't
16 undermine any of the findings that were given by the
17 prosecutor in his strikes, particularly of Mr. --
18 Mr. Hood and Ms. Garrett.

19 They certainly can be interpreted in two
20 ways. In -- in our response brief to this Court -- we
21 don't know when we say, you know, this is why these
22 highlights are there. There is a reasonable
23 explanation, just as Mr. Foster is given speculation in
24 his arguments. We don't know.

25 But when they're --

1 JUSTICE BREYER: What is the reasonable
2 explanation?

3 MS. BURTON: The reasonable explanation in
4 this case is, four months prior to trial, as was
5 previously argued, Batson had just come out. Batson is
6 new. Four months prior to trial, defense counsel files
7 a motion and says, the strike of any black juror, we're
8 filing a Batson challenge. Two weeks prior to trial, he
9 says -- he files a motion and says, I'm -- there's
10 racial disparity in 179 jurors. And that's the --
11 that's the list that's challenged, the 179. There is
12 racial disparity of black prospective jurors on that
13 list.

14 The day of trial, he re-files that. So I
15 would be more surprised, quite frankly, if there wasn't
16 some sort of highlighting, or if --

17 JUSTICE BREYER: In other words, the
18 argument you're making here --

19 MS. BURTON: Exactly.

20 JUSTICE BREYER: -- is that -- is that the
21 reason he highlighted all the black jurors in green and
22 thus said black -- what about the black jurors and did
23 all these different things was because he was preparing
24 a defense in case of a Batson challenge.

25 MS. BURTON: Correct.

1 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. Now, if that's
2 correct, why this is -- is this the first -- is it --
3 was this argument made before your main brief in this
4 case?

5 MS. BURTON: And it was not --

6 JUSTICE BREYER? It's been several years.
7 Yes or no?

8 MS. BURTON: And it was not. And that's --
9 and --

10 JUSTICE BREYER: It was not.

11 So if that had been his real reason, isn't
12 it a little surprising that he never thought of it --

13 (Laughter.)

14 JUSTICE BREYER: -- or didn't tell anybody
15 until you raise this argument in your main brief?

16 MS. BURTON: And -- and I -- I would -- I
17 would say that's on State habeas counsel. We relied on
18 our res judicata bar throughout State habeas; and then
19 after that, basically defended the factual findings of
20 the State habeas.

21 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. It seems to me
22 you have two arguments.

23 One is this argument that he never thought
24 of, apparently, or at least never thought to tell you
25 until quite recently. And the other, after years, and

1 so it's hard to believe that's his real reason.

2 And then there's the second argument that he
3 had about 40 different reasons. And at least some of
4 them could be valid. Okay.

5 Now, if my grandson tells me, I don't want
6 to watch -- I don't want to do my homework tonight at
7 7:00 because I'm just so tired. And besides, I promised
8 my friend I'd play basketball. And besides that,
9 there's a great program on television. And besides
10 that, you know, I really -- my stomach is upset, but I
11 want to eat spaghetti. And so he's now given me five
12 different reasons.

13 What do I think of those reasons?

14 MS. BURTON: Well, in this case -- and
15 again, I think this is --

16 JUSTICE BREYER: One may be valid.

17 MS. BURTON: Correct, and the other ones
18 also may be --

19 JUSTICE BREYER: Which one?

20 MS. BURTON: Well, they all may be valid,
21 but they all may not be as strong as -- as the -- as the
22 first one. But in this case, I think the important
23 part --

24 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, wait. The point is
25 he gave 40 different reasons. And the very fact that he

1 gives 40 different reasons -- and many of them are
2 self-contradictory, obviously not applicable, totally
3 different from -- you know, that's why I used my
4 grandchild's analogy. All right?

5 And so I would say my answer to my
6 grandchild is, look, you're not too tired to do your
7 homework. And I think any reasonable person looking at
8 this would say, no, his reason was a purpose to
9 discriminate on the basis of race.

10 Now, tell me why I'm wrong.

11 MS. BURTON: I think because you have to
12 look at the time period this was done. This was done
13 not -- you know, a year after Batson came out. And even
14 throughout the transcript, people -- defense counsel and
15 the prosecutor says, we're -- we don't really know where
16 Batson is going.

17 So in this case, the prosecutor, dealing
18 with Batson for the first time, the first time in
19 history anybody has had to put strikes on the record.

20 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But he's simply wrong. He
21 puts down, if it comes -- if it comes down to having to
22 pick one of the black jurors -- was it Ms. Garrett? --
23 might be okay.

24 MS. BURTON: And that's -- that's Mr. Lundy.
25 That's the investigator.

1 JUSTICE KENNEDY: So it -- it -- it -- well,
2 but that seems to me to undercut the argument, well,
3 they're just feeling their way and so forth. They've --
4 they've made a mistake -- they've made a mistake of --
5 in Batson. Sure it was new; but they're wrong.

6 MS. BURTON: Well, first let me say, I think
7 that's why there was a laundry list because he was just
8 espousing every reason he had. But with regard to
9 Mr. Lundy's, notes, and that was the investigator who
10 said if we have to choose a black juror, she may be the
11 best one.

12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Who was responsible for
13 the definite no list?

14 MS. BURTON: The definite no list, nobody --
15 the only person that was asked about that was Mr. Lundy,
16 who was deposed and said he could not identify who wrote
17 that list. So we don't --

18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: There are only three
19 possible choices.

20 MS. BURTON: We -- right. We know it came
21 from the D.A.'s office.

22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And it -- and it
23 exists -- the paper exists. It says "Definite NO."

24 MS. BURTON: Correct. And I don't think
25 that is -- I don't think that was a ranking of jurors,

1 because when you look, they did score jurors throughout.

2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But there were five
3 African-American jurors --

4 MS. BURTON: Correct.

5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- on the definite --
6 well, one of them was Garrett -- this -- as was pointed
7 out. They said, if we have to have one, let it be
8 Garrett. But Garrett then shows up on the definite no
9 list.

10 MS. BURTON: Correct. And --

11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Were we told that the
12 only three people who did the investigation on Batson
13 were the two prosecutors on the case and Mr. Lundy? So
14 if Mr. Lundy says I didn't make that list, it has to be
15 one of the two prosecutors.

16 MS. BURTON: It has to be one of the two
17 prosecutors, and one was not there on the day it was
18 struck -- the jury was struck; only Mr. Lanier was. But
19 if that's not Mr. Lanier's thought process of this
20 definite -- this definite no list -- and I don't see
21 that that gets you to clear error in the striking of
22 Mr. Hood or Ms. Garrett.

23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What do you do with
24 other -- I mean, it just -- it seems an out-and-out
25 false statement. The reason that's given -- one of the

1 reasons for Garrett's being struck is that her cousin
2 was arrested. But then the prosecutor doesn't know that
3 at the time of the voir dire. He doesn't know until
4 after the voir dire that the cousin was arrested. So
5 how could it possibly be a reason at the time of the
6 voir dire?

7 MS. BURTON: And I don't think the record
8 bears that out. These notes -- the highlighted notes
9 that Petitioner wants to say, these were used during
10 voir dire, these were using during the strikes, in those
11 notes -- and this is at Joint Appendix page 256 --
12 Angela is written out beside Ms. Garrett's name. In
13 Mr. Lundy's notes where he said he wrote down things he
14 knew prior to the strikes, prior to voir dire of what he
15 knew about individual jurors, he wrote down as to
16 Marilyn Garrett, Angela Garrett is a cousin. So -- and
17 then, Mr. Lanier testified --

18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Didn't the habeas
19 court --

20 JUSTICE ALITO: Did Mr. Lanier testify --

21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice.

22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- provide an excuse and
23 say -- I'm sorry.

24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No.

25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Didn't the habeas court

1 accept that he didn't know at the time of trial, but he
2 just knew that Lundy didn't want her?

3 MS. BURTON: The -- what the -- the habeas
4 court actually credited the fact that Mr. Lundy had
5 advised trial counsel that Angela Garrett should be
6 struck.

7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But that was his
8 explanation for why the prosecutor didn't know about the
9 prior arrest, correct?

10 MS. BURTON: No, I think the -- I think the
11 State habeas court credited that as one of the facts of
12 the strike.

13 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That Mr. Lundy didn't
14 want her.

15 MS. BURTON: Excuse me, I --

16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That Mr. Lundy didn't
17 want her. He never credited or never said that he knew
18 this -- that he knew about the arrest.

19 MS. BURTON: Mr. -- actually, Mr. Lanier
20 testified twice, though, that he was aware at the time
21 of jury selection that he knew about --

22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Lundy did, but the
23 prosecutor didn't.

24 MS. BURTON: Well, no. In the motion for a
25 new trial that Mr. Lanier -- the prosecutor testified

1 and said, I knew during voir dire; Mr. Lundy told me
2 that. That's at Joint Appendix 105 and 112, that he
3 knew --

4 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, didn't he also
5 testify -- this is on 14 of the reply brief -- it has
6 come to our attention since the trial of this case that
7 Angela Garrett was arrested?

8 MS. BURTON: It says on -- on that page of
9 the -- on that part of the transcript, which I -- I
10 cannot explain to you in -- in contrast to in the notes,
11 it is noted that she is the cousin prior to the jury
12 selection, unless that means -- and I've read it several
13 times -- since that time she's been dismissed from her
14 job. Again, it's unclear as --

15 JUSTICE ALITO: What about the -- what about
16 the giving a reason for dismissing her that she was
17 close in age to the defendant?

18 MS. BURTON: When -- and the --

19 JUSTICE ALITO: She was in her 30s. He was
20 18 or 19.

21 MS. BURTON: And when he initially
22 strikes -- when Mr. Lanier initially explains his
23 strikes, he does state her age, so he is not trying to
24 say she's 23. He states her age as 34. And throughout,
25 the overall theme was, we don't want younger jurors.

1 We're looking for older jurors closer to the age of the
2 victim, age 79.

3 So I think -- you know, maybe -- I know it's
4 not -- not the most articulate framing of it, but I
5 think it's more of a generational, she was younger. And
6 that, the age, I don't think was a make-or-break factor.
7 Working at Head Start with underprivileged children, a
8 make-or-break factor; a similarly situated white juror
9 also struck for that same purpose.

10 JUSTICE KAGAN: But -- but Ms. Burton,
11 wouldn't you agree, in a lot of these Batson cases,
12 you'll have purported justifications, which they could
13 support a valid peremptory strike, right? But that the
14 question for a court is, well, but did they support this
15 valid peremptory strike? In other words, what was the
16 prosecutor thinking? Batson is a rule about purposeful
17 discrimination, about intent.

18 And so it doesn't really matter that there
19 might have been a bunch of valid reasons out there, if
20 the -- if it was clear that the prosecutor was thinking
21 about race.

22 You agree with that, right?

23 MS. BURTON: I think if his intent was to
24 strike based on race.

25 JUSTICE KAGAN: Yes, if his intent was to

1 strike based on race, it doesn't matter that he could
2 have had a different intent that would have supported a
3 good peremptory strike. And so the question of whether,
4 you know, someone or other might have been properly
5 struck by -- by a prosecutor isn't really the question.
6 The question is on the total amount of evidence before
7 us, including all these prosecutors' notes, what was
8 going on with respect to each of these peremptory
9 strikes.

10 And then you have to deal with not just, oh,
11 it could have been this or it could have been that, but
12 you have to deal with all this information that what it
13 really was, was they wanted to get the black people off
14 the jury.

15 MS. BURTON: And -- and I don't think these
16 notes show that. What the notes show, again, with
17 Ms. Hood -- Mr. Hood and Ms. Garrett, they're
18 contemporaneous notes taken at the time of trial as to
19 each of these jurors, are the reasons they struck them.
20 I mean, there's no derogatory comments within those
21 notes.

22 JUSTICE SCALIA: Where -- where there are,
23 you know, other reasons that are plausible but could be
24 phony, surely it's the -- it's the judge that hears the
25 testimony who's best able to judge whether asserted

1 reasons are phony reasons or not; isn't that right?

2 MS. BURTON: Yes, Your Honor. And -- and I
3 don't believe that --

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: It's sort of hard for us to
5 do it on a cold record.

6 MS. BURTON: Well, but --

7 JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, it's harder. It's
8 harder, not impossible, but harder.

9 JUSTICE KAGAN: And Justice Scalia raises,
10 of -- of course, a good point in the mine run of cases,
11 but not in a case where all the evidence of intentional
12 discrimination was not before the judge at the time.

13 MS. BURTON: And -- and again, I don't think
14 there's -- I don't think there's clear error here on
15 these notes of racial discrimination. Their strikes are
16 sound as to Mr. Hood. You would not want Mr. Hood on
17 the jury regardless of his race, based on his reasons.
18 The what -- reason that he gives a laundry list, like I
19 said, may well have been because we're in 1987, and
20 you're just putting out everything you can because
21 you're not exactly sure what you're supposed to do.

22 Well --

23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Why weren't the notes
24 turned over earlier?

25 MS. BURTON: The -- the notes were not

1 turned over earlier, although it was brought up in the
2 motion for a new trial in November, right after the
3 trial in 1987. And the prosecutor, Mr. Lanier, says, I
4 will -- said, I will give my notes to the court to look
5 at en banc if defense counsel will do the same.

6 Defense counsel chose not to do so. That
7 issue was raised on appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court,
8 direct appeal. The Georgia court -- Georgia court found
9 it was work product; it didn't have to be turned over.

10 When we got to State habeas proceedings,
11 they found an open records request under Georgia law.
12 And they were immediately turned over. I -- I don't
13 think there was any argument about it at that point.

14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What did they do with
15 the failure to ask Ms. Garrett any questions about the
16 issues that troubled the -- troubled, for example, her
17 cousin's arrest. There's an assumption that she has a
18 relationship with this cousin. I have cousins who I
19 know have been arrested, but I have no idea where
20 they're in jail. I hardly -- I don't know them. So --
21 but he didn't ask any questions. Doesn't that show
22 pretext? I don't -- I'm not going to inquire because
23 she might get off the hook on that.

24 MS. BURTON: Well, I think a number of
25 times -- and I know this Court's precedent on not asking

1 questions is particularly in voir dire as to people.
2 But as to a number of issues, I think when you're in
3 voir dire and you're asking questions, you don't
4 necessarily care what the answer is because with regard
5 to Mr. Hood, if he had said, yes, I have a son that's
6 been arrested, it's not going to bother me a bit that
7 you prosecuted my son.

8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, stealing hubcaps,
9 in my mind, is decidedly different than murdering people
10 or attacking them the way this case was -- this case was
11 about. I -- I can imagine a -- why can't you imagine a
12 father saying, it was stealing hubcaps --

13 MS. BURTON: And he --

14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- he should have been
15 punished?

16 MS. BURTON: And he may well have, but it's
17 a risk I don't -- the prosecutor --

18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's what the record
19 supports.

20 MS. BURTON: Well, it's a risk the
21 prosecutor didn't have to take. I -- if you have
22 somebody -- and, as I said, Mr. Hood could very well
23 have said that, very well have meant that, never have
24 been lying. But in my mind, I'm thinking, he's going to
25 get back there and he's going to think, oh, I don't know

1 about --

2 JUSTICE BREYER: I -- I want to ask you a
3 different question before your time is up. And I'd like
4 you to respond to the question that Justice Alito
5 initially asked.

6 MS. BURTON: Okay.

7 JUSTICE BREYER: And that is, is there an
8 independent State ground here? Now, you're familiar
9 with the record.

10 MS. BURTON: Yes.

11 JUSTICE BREYER: And I read on page 192 of
12 the -- of your record the decision. And the first
13 paragraph supports your -- the view that you would like
14 to hold, I think, that this is based upon res judicata,
15 which is a State matter.

16 And then there is the paragraph that was
17 read to you on page 195 and 196 where the judge says,
18 "The reason that I reach that conclusion is because the
19 notes and records submitted by Petitioner failed to
20 demonstrate purposeful discrimination on the basis that
21 the race was the basis." Okay? That sounds like Batson
22 to me.

23 And then he goes on to say, "And in addition
24 there is no good reason given, now or then."

25 And then he concludes, "Accordingly, the

1 court finds the renewed Batson claim is without merit."

2 So if I read just that paragraph, I would
3 think the reason that the judge found in your favor is
4 he decided the Batson claim in your favor. He didn't
5 have to. He could have gone on some other ground, but
6 that's the ground he did go on.

7 But at worst, why isn't it ambiguous? And
8 if it is ambiguous, then why don't we take, you know --
9 I think it's what's in the -- Long, you know, all those
10 cases. If it's ambiguous, then aren't we required to
11 assume that the judge went on the Federal ground? Okay?

12 Now, that's both Alito's question. It's
13 what I think is the hardest point for you to overcome.
14 And I want to hear your response.

15 MS. BURTON: I actually agree that it's
16 unclear. I think --

17 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, that's the end of it,
18 isn't it?

19 MS. BURTON: It is -- it is the end of it.
20 I think it's unclear.

21 The other -- one other issue --

22 JUSTICE ALITO: What do you think is Georgia
23 res judicata law?

24 MS. BURTON: I think res judicata in -- in
25 Georgia, if you have new facts or new evidence --

1 JUSTICE ALITO: The res judicata goes out
2 the window.

3 MS. BURTON: Then you -- then the court gets
4 to look at the issue and go beyond. And I think in this
5 case --

6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. I didn't
7 hear that. Then this Court?

8 MS. BURTON: In -- in -- in this case, once
9 you have new facts or new evidence, if the Court in this
10 case finds that they can review the evidence anew and a
11 new review is had, then I think you are beyond that bar.

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: I -- I don't understand
13 what you've just said. Say it again.

14 MS. BURTON: Okay.

15 (Laughter.)

16 MS. BURTON: If you have -- if the issue has
17 been decided on direct appeal and you cannot go back to
18 it -- a superior court obviously can't overturn the
19 State's highest court. But when you have new evidence,
20 such as in this case, and it is strong evidence, that
21 the court feels like it has to go -- it has to look at
22 that evidence -- and in this case it did -- then I think
23 you are beyond the res judicata bar.

24 JUSTICE KAGAN: Yes, I mean, I think that
25 that's exactly how the decision is framed, right?

1 Because the decision talks about claims that are not
2 reviewable due to res judicata. It lists many, many,
3 many claims, and then it lists a whole bunch of claims
4 that are procedurally defaulted. And then this is in a
5 separate section, the Batson issue, and it's in a
6 section that's with -- with all the other claims that
7 there are merits determinations being made about.

8 And the court is very clear, first sentence,
9 last sentence. First sentence: "The court finds the
10 prosecution did not violate Batson versus Kentucky."

11 Last sentence: "On the merits the person,
12 the" -- "the" -- "the Petitioner loses."

13 So --

14 MS. BURTON: As much as I would like it --

15 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- it is --

16 MS. BURTON: As much as I would like it to
17 be an adequate and independent State law ground, I'm not
18 sure I clearly have that here --

19 JUSTICE ALITO: What do you make of the
20 statement on 175, "As a preliminary matter, this court
21 notes that, as cited by the Respondent, the following
22 claims are not reviewable based on the doctrine of
23 res judicata"? And the first one it lists is the Batson
24 claim. Does that suggest maybe the court had two
25 reasons for what it did? It's barred by res judicata,

1 and it would fail even if it were not.

2 JUSTICE KAGAN: No. But that --

3 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, I'd like the -- I'm
4 sorry. I'd like counsel --

5 (Laughter.)

6 JUSTICE KAGAN: Sorry.

7 MS. BURTON: Yes, I think it -- if -- if
8 anything, it is an alternate ruling.

9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But doesn't Georgia have
10 the rule -- Georgia, the supreme court has said, Georgia
11 law allows claims to be revisited on habeas when new
12 facts have developed since the time of the direct appeal
13 because a claim that is based on facts that did not
14 actually exist at the time of the direct appeal, which
15 is this case, is essentially a different claim. That's
16 what the Georgia Supreme Court said.

17 MS. BURTON: Yes.

18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: New facts is essentially
19 a different claim.

20 MS. BURTON: Yes, Your Honor.

21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: You may be right or wrong
22 as a matter of conclusion law, but that's the law of
23 Georgia.

24 MS. BURTON: That is the law.

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

1 MS. BURTON. Thank you.

2 Mr. Bright, you have two minutes remaining.

3 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF STEPHEN B. BRIGHT

4 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

5 MR. BRIGHT: Thank you. Very quickly, let
6 me first say that with regard to what Justice Alito
7 quoted that it's just come to our attention since the
8 trial of the case that Ms. Garrett cousin was arrested.
9 That was on May the 1st. That was after the death
10 verdict had been returned in this case.

11 Secondly, if you look at the Joint Appendix
12 on page 56 and 57 where they give the reasons for
13 striking Ms. Garrett, there is no mention of her cousin
14 whatsoever in there. That's the time when she should
15 have been mentioned, after the strikes were made. And
16 yet there is no mention of that at all.

17 So I don't think there's any way -- and then
18 six months later, there is a motion for new trial, and
19 now the prosecution is adding new reasons that it didn't
20 give at the Batson hearing.

21 It's saying she was a social worker. She
22 wasn't a social worker. It's saying her cousin was
23 arrested. They didn't know that at the time they struck
24 the jury. They said she's low income, taking another
25 thing out of United States v. Cartlidge. But you can't

1 add reasons on into perpetuity. The reasons are the
2 reasons articulated in -- in Miller-El, and the
3 prosecutor has got to stand or fall on the reasons.

4 With regard to the questions, I -- I just
5 want to make one quick point on that because there's not
6 much time. But with regard to Ms. Garrett and Martha
7 Duncan, who were both teachers aides, who were at
8 schools that were literally right in the same
9 neighborhood -- Ms. Duncan had kindergarten students;
10 Ms. Garrett was Head Start -- no questions: What kind
11 of children do you have, Ms. Duncan?

12 I mean, Ms. Duncan, if you look at the --
13 they also said familiarity with the neighborhood.
14 Ms. Garrett lived, like, 18 or 20 miles away.
15 Ms. Duncan lived 200 -- her -- her school was 250 yards
16 away, and she lived a half-mile from the school.

17 Both of them answered that they weren't
18 familiar with the area where the victim lived. Now then
19 some more questions after those answers would have
20 provided a difference. But instead, Ms. Garrett is
21 treated as a liar, and Ms. Duncan is accepted and
22 actually serves as a juror in this case.

23 And there are other examples, with Mr. Hood
24 particularly, with regard to the child. If you had
25 asked: What about your child who was arrested? He was

1 put on probation -- he was -- \$180 of -- can I have just
2 a second? -- \$180 restitution, and he went off to the --
3 this is in the record -- went off to the Navy, served
4 his country honorably, got an honorable discharge, and
5 came back. That --

6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

7 The case is submitted.

8 (Whereupon, at 11:05 a.m., the case in the
9 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

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a.m 1:13 3:2 61:8	Alito 8:11,20 9:21 13:5 24:18 46:20	appellate 5:14 5:17 30:14	59:8,23 60:25	51:17 54:14 57:22 58:13
able 50:25	48:4,15,19	Appendix 8:24	arsenal 25:15	bases 26:25
above-entitled 1:11 61:9	54:4 55:22	9:3 18:10	articulate 49:4	basic 19:24
absolutely 16:9 26:5	56:1 57:19	20:12 46:11	articulated 60:2	basically 12:3
accept 5:7 17:7 38:2 47:1	58:3 59:6	48:2 59:11	asked 15:6 17:24,25 37:17	19:7 39:6 41:19
acceptable 24:17	Alito's 22:25 55:12	applicable 43:2	44:15 54:5	basis 5:3,6 12:20 17:15 43:9 54:20,21
accepted 60:21	allow 13:10	application 4:19 8:16 11:11 35:14	60:25	basket 13:18
accepting 5:3,6	allows 58:11	applied 17:13 22:1,2	asking 52:25 53:3	basketball 42:8
accepts 16:3,4	alternate 58:8	applies 17:11 24:14 33:25	asserted 50:25	Batson 8:16,24 9:3,9,15,16
Act 20:3 29:7	ambiguous 55:7 55:8,10	apply 4:15 12:23	assertion 20:8	10:17,25 12:4 12:10 14:1,18
add 60:1	amici 23:10	Appointed 1:16	assume 55:11	15:5,9 17:11 17:13 18:22
adding 13:17 59:19	amount 50:6	approach 22:22 24:6	assuming 25:21	19:3,4,11 20:16,25 22:20
addition 24:22 54:23	analogy 43:4	appropriate 22:21 37:19	assumption 52:17	24:6,14 25:8 25:22 26:7,12
address 3:14 9:15 28:10	analysis 17:6 24:7	area 60:18	assurance 4:2	26:14 39:10,13 40:5,5,8,24
addressed 6:3 7:16	anew 56:10	arguable 4:9,12 5:2,6 8:14	Atlanta 1:15,17	43:13,16,18 44:5 45:12
addressing 4:12 4:13	Angela 46:12,16 47:5 48:7	31:14 33:8	attacking 53:10	49:11,16 54:21 55:1,4 57:5,10 57:23 59:20
adequate 57:17	answer 27:6 32:4 37:22	34:16,20,25	attention 6:17 14:3 48:6 59:7	bear 17:8
advised 47:5	43:5 53:4	35:1,10,12,14	attorney 1:17 15:17 23:19	bears 28:7 46:8
affect 17:6	answered 17:23 29:17 60:17	argue 9:7,12 10:5	authorized 20:6	behalf 1:15,18 2:4,7,10 3:7 28:2 59:4
affidavit 20:11	answering 24:24	argued 40:5	available 29:23	belabor 13:6
African-Amer... 15:15 21:5 27:13 39:5 45:3	answers 14:22 60:19	argues 24:4	avoid 15:9	believe 8:3 21:18 22:20 28:5,13 29:25 31:11,16,25 32:5,9,13 34:24 35:2,21 35:21,24 37:13 37:15 42:1 51:3
African-Amer... 14:13 16:12 17:2 21:6 22:3	antithesis 39:10	arguing 13:6 21:14	aware 47:20	bell 31:3,5,7
age 48:17,23,24 49:1,2,6	anybody 20:13 41:14 43:19	argument 1:12 2:2,5,8 3:3,6 6:10 13:11 14:9 28:1 40:18 41:3,15 41:23 42:2 44:2 52:13 59:3		best 44:11 50:25
agree 49:11,22 55:15	apologize 38:8	arguments 39:24 41:22	B	BETH 1:17 2:6
agreeing 26:11	apparently 41:24	arrest 27:4 47:9 47:18 52:17	B 1:15 2:3,9 3:6 18:10 59:3	
aides 60:7	appeal 11:17 22:15 23:20 29:6,7,9,9 34:6 34:8,11 52:7,8 56:17 58:12,14	arrested 27:1 46:2,4 48:7 52:19 53:6	back 7:6,22 8:1 16:4 53:25 56:17 61:5	
Ake 10:10,14,25 12:24 14:2	appeals 32:16 32:16,17		background 18:2,5	
	appear 8:4		backstriking 16:5	
	APPEARAN... 1:14		balance 27:23	
	appears 3:23		banc 52:5	
			bar 9:5,20 12:23 13:10 41:18 56:11,23	
			bargain 19:21	
			barred 57:25	
			based 8:25 49:24 50:1	

<p>28:1 beyond 20:15 56:4,11,23 bit 53:6 black 3:12 14:15 14:17 15:18 16:17 17:17,18 18:3,5,12,18 18:20 24:4 40:7,12,21,22 40:22 43:22 44:10 50:13 Blackman 5:18 7:15 blacks 15:2,4,20 18:10,15 19:5 book 30:24 bother 53:6 BREYER 30:2,9 30:12,16,23 31:5,8,15,18 31:23 32:2,7 32:10,18 40:1 40:17,20 41:1 41:6,10,14,21 42:16,19,24 54:2,7,11 55:17 brief 14:5 18:19 39:20 41:3,15 48:5 briefed 14:5 Bright 1:15 2:3 2:9 3:5,6,8,13 3:17 4:14 5:11 6:5,22,25 7:19 7:25 8:18 9:12 9:23 10:1,6,9 10:23 11:8,12 11:15,19,23 12:1,5,9,15,24 13:13,22,25 14:10,22 16:20 17:7,12,20,22 18:6,16 19:1 19:13,15 20:9 22:12,13,18,23</p>	<p>24:2,8 25:8,25 26:3,16 27:10 27:15,18,20 59:2,3,5 bring 11:16 brother 30:18 brought 52:1 BRUCE 1:6 bunch 49:19 57:3 burden 28:7 Burton 1:17 2:6 27:25 28:1,3 28:11,25 29:13 29:20,25 30:8 30:10,13,22 31:4,7,10,16 31:25 32:5,9 32:13 33:6,14 33:23 34:7,11 34:18,22 35:3 35:6,13,17,21 36:2,6,10,12 36:14,16,20 37:2,4,12,21 38:7,16,23 39:14 40:3,19 40:25 41:5,8 41:16 42:14,17 42:20 43:11,24 44:6,14,20,24 45:4,10,16 46:7 47:3,10 47:15,19,24 48:8,18,21 49:10,23 50:15 51:2,6,13,25 52:24 53:13,16 53:20 54:6,10 55:15,19,24 56:3,8,14,16 57:14,16 58:7 58:17,20,24 59:1 busy 35:1,4 Butts 8:10</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">C</p> <p>C 2:1 3:1 call 20:3,7 canned 23:12 capital 34:12 care 35:1 53:4 carefully 24:11 Carolina 5:15 5:17 7:2,5 Cartlidge 59:25 case 3:4,10 4:8,9 4:22 6:1,6,9 7:1,3,10 8:3,6 8:9,22 10:16 13:15 14:6,14 14:21 15:4,7 17:5,16 18:18 23:11,13,16,17 24:14,17 25:16 27:18 28:6,16 29:4,21 30:4 30:25 31:24 32:4,8,12 33:7 34:9,9,12,16 34:19 35:4,9 37:13,16,19 38:10 40:4,24 41:4 42:14,22 43:17 45:13 48:6 51:11 53:10,10 56:5 56:8,10,20,22 58:15 59:8,10 60:22 61:7,8 case-by-case 24:19 cases 4:15 6:1,2 7:11,17,18 23:11 25:9 29:3,13 30:14 33:2,3,9,25 34:1 36:25 37:4 38:11 49:11 51:10 55:10 cast 27:8</p>	<p>cause 4:7,20 16:15 21:6,9 31:13 cert 14:5 35:19 certain 33:2,13 33:19 certainly 32:14 34:12 37:21 39:19 certificate 4:7 4:19 31:13 certification 38:4 certified 29:17 29:22 38:3 certify 29:23 37:20 certiorari 3:15 3:18,20 6:7,11 7:8 8:7 28:10 28:19 36:19 challenge 12:4 14:19 15:9 18:23 22:20 40:8,24 challenged 40:11 chance 15:24 change 9:4,19 changed 11:14 characteristics 22:2 charge 12:4 Chatman 1:6 3:4 37:16 check 18:2 Chief 3:3,8,13 4:10 14:8 16:19,21 17:2 27:24 28:3,9 31:12,20 32:3 46:21,24 58:25 61:6 child 60:24,25 children 49:7 60:11 choices 44:19</p>	<p>choose 44:10 choosing 20:18 chose 52:6 circuit 22:15 23:21 28:22 36:9 37:11,13 37:23 circumstance 25:2 circumstances 16:14 25:10,10 26:18 cited 33:9 57:21 citizens 27:13 claim 4:13,13 9:3,10,16 10:17 11:1,2,7 12:10,18 13:3 13:11 55:1,4 57:24 58:13,15 58:19 claims 57:1,3,3 57:6,22 58:11 clear 14:2 16:12 18:16 26:6 28:8 35:18 37:24 39:12 45:21 49:20 51:14 57:8 cleared 22:7 clearer 35:17 clearly 10:16 21:10 25:4 57:18 close 48:17 closer 49:1 cold 51:5 collected 15:13 color 18:8 color-highligh... 20:10 colored 18:8 come 23:11 25:11 40:5 48:6 59:7 comes 13:7 15:15 36:2</p>
---	---	---	---	--

<p>43:21,21 coming 37:5 commend 14:2 comments 50:20 Company 3:24 completely 21:25 compliance 31:21 concedes 18:19 concentrating 14:17 concludes 54:25 conclusion 25:12 54:18 58:22 confused 34:3 confusion 5:20 7:15 conjunction 13:20 considered 5:10 26:18 considering 12:15,17 26:19 constitutional 13:1 contemporane... 50:18 contest 10:19 contrast 48:10 convictions 24:21 corner 18:11 corpus 4:18 29:7 correct 8:16 32:14 33:14,21 34:7 36:10 37:2 40:25 41:2 42:17 44:24 45:4,10 47:9 correction 32:14 counsel 14:8 16:19 18:22 27:24 28:12 40:6 41:17</p>	<p>43:14 47:5 52:5,6 58:4,25 61:6 country 61:4 County 3:25 8:10 course 3:19 15:8 17:14 20:19 23:9 25:8 51:10 court 1:1,12,16 3:9,10,15,19 3:20,21,25 4:1 4:3,4,15,18,18 4:20,25,25 5:1 5:5,7,14,15,17 5:17,18,19,22 6:3,7,11,13,15 6:21,25 7:4,5,8 7:9,12,16,20 7:23 8:1,7,10 8:10,12,23 9:7 9:14,14 10:1 10:11,11,14,15 11:2 12:2,6,9 12:18,19,24 13:3,10,15,25 14:6 15:5,6 17:10,12,13 20:22,23,24 21:4,17 22:24 23:5,12 24:6,8 24:11,13 25:3 26:23 27:11 28:4,15,16,17 28:17,19,19 29:4,8,11,24 30:5,15 31:17 32:20 33:2 35:20,22,24 36:3,19,25 37:5,10,14,20 37:22 38:2,6 38:12,15,17 39:13,20 46:19 46:25 47:4,11 49:14 52:4,7,8</p>	<p>52:8 55:1 56:3 56:7,9,18,19 56:21 57:8,9 57:20,24 58:10 58:16 Court's 8:4,19 14:3 28:14 52:25 courts 22:15 23:7 25:19,20 26:1 29:2 36:9 cousin 27:1 46:1 46:4,16 48:11 52:18 59:8,13 59:22 cousin's 27:3 52:17 cousins 52:18 create 26:14 credibility 26:9 credited 47:4,11 47:17 criminal 23:7 currently 37:12 cut 19:20</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">D</p> <hr/> <p>D 3:1 D.A.'s 44:21 D.C 1:8 damning 20:20 day 40:14 45:17 de 12:2 deal 50:10,12 dealing 37:5 43:17 dealt 15:21 death 16:14 59:9 death-only 33:25 decide 8:17 10:9 10:11,12,15 14:1 15:25 decided 3:25 5:18 7:12 9:7 10:1,16,18 13:25 15:5</p>	<p>26:2 33:12 55:4 56:17 decidedly 53:9 deciding 10:20 10:21 14:6 decision 4:2,17 4:17 5:4 7:4,22 8:2,2 35:11 54:12 56:25 57:1 decisions 7:23 25:18 defaulted 57:4 defeat 22:20 defendant 48:17 defended 41:19 defense 18:22 19:7,15 40:6 40:24 43:14 52:5,6 definite 16:8,11 20:21 21:1 27:14 44:13,14 44:23 45:5,8 45:20,20 demonstrably 21:23 26:6 demonstrate 25:22 54:20 denied 4:8,21,21 4:22 5:15 7:4 7:21,21 denies 28:18 denying 20:24 depends 11:6 13:1 deposed 44:16 deposition 18:8 Deputy 1:17 derogatory 50:20 designates 18:12 determination 33:18 determinations 57:7 determine 8:13</p>	<p>8:14 25:5 determined 3:11 developed 16:7 58:12 difference 5:23 60:20 different 11:21 11:24 22:21 34:6 37:7 40:23 42:3,12 42:25 43:1,3 50:2 53:9 54:3 58:15,19 differently 27:13 dire 16:13 22:9 46:3,4,6,10,14 48:1 53:1,3 direct 11:17 34:11 52:8 56:17 58:12,14 directed 3:16 6:17 36:19 directly 32:16 disagree 28:12 discharge 61:4 discretion 32:22 33:1,12,19,20 34:10 37:19 discretionary 28:18,21 29:6 29:7,12,16 30:15 32:6,17 32:20 33:3,7,8 33:20 35:23 37:1,1 38:10 38:12 discriminate 43:9 discriminated 15:10 discrimination 23:6 49:17 51:12,15 54:20 discussed 19:2 dismissed 48:13 dismissing 48:16</p>
--	---	---	--	--

<p>disparity 40:10 40:12</p> <p>disqualifying 14:20</p> <p>district 15:17</p> <p>docketed 8:9</p> <p>doctrine 8:25 57:22</p> <p>doing 39:4</p> <p>doubt 27:8</p> <p>drugs 27:1</p> <p>due 57:2</p> <p>Duncan 60:7,9 60:11,12,15,21</p> <p>Durham 3:25</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">E</p> <hr/> <p>E 2:1 3:1,1</p> <p>earlier 51:24 52:1</p> <p>eat 42:11</p> <p>efforts 23:6</p> <p>eight 3:25</p> <p>either 14:4</p> <p>eleven 21:15</p> <p>Eleventh 28:21 36:9 37:10,13 37:23</p> <p>Elst 37:6</p> <p>en 52:5</p> <p>enact 33:1</p> <p>encourage 24:13 24:15</p> <p>ended 15:23</p> <p>engage 22:8</p> <p>engaged 23:6</p> <p>entirety 28:6</p> <p>erred 16:15</p> <p>error 35:15 45:21 51:14</p> <p>errors 12:16</p> <p>espousing 44:8</p> <p>ESQ 1:15,17 2:3 2:6,9</p> <p>essential 10:21</p> <p>essentially 58:15 58:18</p>	<p>establish 25:20</p> <p>established 7:14</p> <p>establishing 28:7</p> <p>Everybody 19:4</p> <p>evidence 12:21 13:14 18:4 19:24 21:23 22:10 25:6 26:13,17,17 28:6 39:8 50:6 51:11 55:25 56:9,10,19,20 56:22</p> <p>exact 30:6,19 31:8,11,12</p> <p>exactly 6:8 10:10 11:9 12:5 16:1 30:20 40:19 51:21 56:25</p> <p>example 26:24 52:16</p> <p>examples 60:23</p> <p>exclusive 8:1</p> <p>excuse 10:25 23:3 46:22 47:15</p> <p>excused 21:6,9</p> <p>exercise 15:14 32:21 33:12,19 37:19</p> <p>exist 58:14</p> <p>existed 26:15</p> <p>exists 44:23,23</p> <p>explain 10:20 48:10</p> <p>explains 48:22</p> <p>explanation 17:4 22:10 39:23 40:2,3 47:8</p> <p>extensive 18:2,4 18:15</p> <p>extra 21:11</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">F</p> <hr/>	<p>fact 8:13 13:8,9 24:9 42:25 47:4</p> <p>factor 49:6,8</p> <p>factors 28:5</p> <p>facts 9:5,19 11:14,23 12:16 12:17 26:5 47:11 55:25 56:9 58:12,13 58:18</p> <p>factual 41:19</p> <p>fail 58:1</p> <p>failed 54:19</p> <p>failure 22:8 52:15</p> <p>fall 60:3</p> <p>fallen 17:4</p> <p>false 21:23 26:5 26:6 45:25</p> <p>familiar 54:8 60:18</p> <p>familiarity 60:13</p> <p>family 21:9</p> <p>father 53:12</p> <p>favor 55:3,4</p> <p>feasibility 26:8</p> <p>Federal 9:18 10:8,11,15,16 10:18,21 13:1 13:2,24 29:2 37:5,25 55:11</p> <p>feeling 44:3</p> <p>feels 56:21</p> <p>felony 24:21</p> <p>felt 10:17</p> <p>Fifth 23:21</p> <p>filed 3:18 20:11</p> <p>files 27:17 39:3 40:6,9</p> <p>filing 40:8</p> <p>final 17:19</p> <p>find 18:4 22:16 27:3 30:24 33:8</p> <p>findings 39:16</p>	<p>41:19</p> <p>finds 55:1 56:10 57:9</p> <p>fine 7:10 35:13</p> <p>first 3:4,14 15:10 16:3,11 18:9 20:19 27:9 28:10 41:2 42:22 43:18,18 44:6 54:12 57:8,9 57:23 59:6</p> <p>five 16:11 21:6 42:11 45:2</p> <p>floor 24:24 25:7</p> <p>focus 18:19</p> <p>followed 7:2</p> <p>following 57:21</p> <p>forget 30:6</p> <p>forth 44:3</p> <p>Foster 1:3 3:4 39:23</p> <p>Foster's 9:15</p> <p>found 10:17 11:3 22:14 28:22 52:8,11 55:3</p> <p>four 16:25 18:9 40:4,6</p> <p>framed 10:23 56:25</p> <p>framing 49:4</p> <p>frankly 40:15</p> <p>Freedom 20:2</p> <p>Friday 3:15 15:23</p> <p>friend 42:8</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">G</p> <hr/> <p>G 3:1</p> <p>Ga 1:15,18</p> <p>Garrett 15:16 15:18 20:22,23 21:1,2,12,16 21:24 26:25 39:18 43:22 45:6,8,8,22</p>	<p>46:16,16 47:5 48:7 50:17 52:15 59:8,13 60:6,10,14,20</p> <p>Garrett's 46:1 46:12</p> <p>General 1:17</p> <p>Generally 34:20</p> <p>generational 49:5</p> <p>Georgia 3:19,21 4:4,18,20,24 5:1,5 6:6,7,15 6:20 8:7 11:15 13:7,12 15:1 20:3 25:18,20 26:1,23 28:17 28:17,22,24 29:2,5,5,8,10 29:23,24 30:4 30:15,21,23,25 31:17 32:3,11 35:20 36:8 37:10,14,22 38:2,11,15,17 52:7,8,8,11 55:22,25 58:9 58:10,10,16,23</p> <p>getting 29:9</p> <p>Ginsburg 7:13 7:20 12:19 14:16,23 17:10 20:4 27:6 37:9 38:1 44:12,18 44:22 45:2,5 45:23 51:23 58:9,18,21</p> <p>give 5:19 21:15 24:16 29:18 52:4 59:12,20</p> <p>given 23:14,15 39:16,23 42:11 45:25 54:24</p> <p>gives 43:1 51:18</p> <p>giving 19:18 48:16</p> <p>go 6:11,20 38:21</p>
---	--	--	--	---

55:6 56:4,17 56:21 goal 27:12 goes 5:22 6:12 16:2 54:23 56:1 going 8:12,14 9:14 12:3 15:3 15:25 16:1,4,9 19:5 24:13,15 39:12,13 43:16 50:8 52:22 53:6,24,25 good 21:16 50:3 51:10 54:24 govern 31:23 32:3,7,12 Grady 7:2 grandchild 43:6 grandchild's 43:4 grandson 42:5 grant 11:2 32:22 granted 4:8 35:20,22 granting 16:16 great 42:9 green 18:11,12 20:13,14 40:21 green-highlig... 20:18 ground 14:20 54:8 55:5,6,11 57:17 grounded 28:23 group 39:5 guarded 20:1 guess 12:22 16:24 gun 25:21 26:4 guns 25:16,17 25:23	29:7 30:4,4,8 30:10,14 32:15 34:5,14,16 35:22 36:3 41:17,18,20 46:18,25 47:3 47:11 52:10 58:11 half-mile 60:16 hand 6:16 11:3 happen 15:6 19:5 happened 5:11 12:22 13:17 14:11 19:7 23:13 32:25 hard 42:1 51:4 harder 51:7,8,8 hardest 55:13 Hardge 15:16 harmony 4:6 Harrington 37:6 Harrison 37:6 Head 49:7 60:10 headed 16:8 hear 3:3 19:11 55:14 56:7 heard 30:18 hearing 18:1 19:4,6,12 20:16 59:20 hears 50:24 held 5:1 10:14 17:11,12 32:12 highest 6:13 28:16 56:19 highlight 20:13 20:14 highlighted 18:11 40:21 46:8 highlighting 40:16 highlights 39:22 Hiles 28:13 historic 15:2 history 38:4	43:19 hold 38:9 54:14 homework 42:6 43:7 Honor 3:17 28:25 29:20 30:1 38:7 51:2 58:20 honorable 61:4 honorably 61:4 Hood 39:18 45:22 50:17,17 51:16,16 53:5 53:22 60:23 hook 52:23 hope 24:16 Hopper 29:14 hot-button 29:1 hubcaps 53:8,12	indicia 25:15 individual 24:21 46:15 information 15:13,14 20:2 39:2 50:12 informed 14:18 initial 18:22 initially 48:21 48:22 54:5 inquire 52:22 insisting 33:20 instruct 21:8 intent 49:17,23 49:25 50:2 intentional 51:11 interesting 19:2 intermediate 5:13,16 6:3 7:4 internal 34:15 interpreted 39:19 inundated 29:9 investigation 45:12 investigator 18:7 27:22 43:25 44:9 involved 27:21 issue 5:9,16 8:7 8:13,15,17,21 8:24 10:13,15 10:16,18,21,22 11:16 13:16,24 14:1,1 25:24 28:12,15 29:1 29:5,17 36:8 36:11,12,15,18 36:21,22,24 37:15,16,22 52:7 55:21 56:4,16 57:5 issued 3:20 31:13 issues 6:18 52:16 53:2	J jail 52:20 JEB 17:12,14 job 48:14 Joint 8:24 9:3 18:9 20:12 46:11 48:2 59:11 Jones 37:16 judge 15:23 16:15 19:21 50:24,25 51:12 54:17 55:3,11 judgment 12:2 26:12,13 judicata 9:1,5 9:20 10:22 11:6,11 12:23 13:7,9,12 41:18 54:14 55:23,24 56:1 56:23 57:2,23 57:25 jurisdiction 10:12 13:3 juror 14:15 16:3 16:4,12 21:16 21:19 22:17 24:5 40:7 44:10 49:8 60:22 jurors 3:12 14:17 15:19 16:2,10,17,22 17:17,17 18:3 18:18,20 22:1 22:2,5 39:5 40:10,12,21,22 43:22 44:25 45:1,3 46:15 48:25 49:1 50:19 jury 3:11 15:2,4 15:22 16:10 19:9 20:19 21:3,8 45:18
H habeas 4:17,18 4:25 11:19 19:14 22:15		I idea 52:19 identical 5:13 identified 14:12 identify 44:16 imagine 53:11 53:11 immediately 52:12 implausible 24:6 implied 21:10 important 22:4 28:5 42:22 impose 16:13 impossible 51:8 impudent 21:17 including 21:24 50:7 income 59:24 inconsistent 21:25 incorrect 6:24 incredible 21:25 independent 13:2 54:8 57:17 indicates 28:14		

47:21 48:11 50:14 51:17 59:24 Justice 3:3,8,13 4:10,23 5:18 5:25 6:10,16 6:23 7:13,15 7:20 8:11,20 9:17,21,25 10:2,3,7,20 11:5,10,13,18 11:20 12:1,7 12:13,19 13:5 13:19,23,23 14:8,16,23 16:19,20,21 17:2,10,20,23 18:13,21 19:10 19:14 20:4 22:12,14,19,25 23:25 24:1,3 24:18 25:17 26:1,10,24 27:6,7,15,19 27:24 28:3,9 28:20 29:10,18 29:22 30:2,9 30:12,16,23 31:5,8,12,15 31:18,20,23 32:2,3,7,10,18 32:19 33:10,11 33:15,16 34:2 34:5,8,14,21 34:23 35:5,11 35:16,18,19 36:1,4,7,11,13 36:15,18,21,23 37:3,9,18 38:1 38:9,14,19,20 38:24 40:1,17 40:20 41:1,6 41:10,14,21 42:16,19,24 43:20 44:1,12 44:18,22 45:2 45:5,11,23	46:18,20,21,21 46:22,24,25 47:7,13,16,22 48:4,15,19 49:10,25 50:22 51:4,7,9,9,23 52:14 53:8,14 53:18 54:2,4,7 54:11 55:17,22 56:1,6,12,24 57:15,19 58:2 58:3,6,9,18,21 58:25 59:6 61:6 justification 25:4 justifications 27:9 49:12 <hr/> K KAGAN 5:25 27:15,19 29:10 33:10,16 36:4 36:7,11,13,23 38:20,24 49:10 49:25 51:9 56:24 57:15 58:2,6 KENNEDY 6:10,23 9:17 9:25 10:3,7 13:19,23 23:25 24:3 35:19 36:1 37:18 43:20 44:1 Kentucky 7:9,9 11:1 15:6 57:10 killer 24:20 kind 17:4 39:9 60:10 kindergarten 60:9 knew 15:25 19:4 46:14,15 47:2 47:17,18,21 48:1,3	know 11:21 17:25 21:8 26:20,20 29:1 31:10 38:3 39:11,21,21,24 42:10 43:3,13 43:15 44:20 46:2,3 47:1,8 49:3,3 50:4,23 52:19,20,25 53:25 55:8,9 59:23 <hr/> L language 9:21 Lanier 16:22 17:21 20:14 45:18 46:17,20 47:19,25 48:22 52:3 Lanier's 45:19 lastly 22:4 Laughter 12:12 17:1 33:5,22 34:4 36:17 38:13 41:13 56:15 58:5 laundry 24:4,10 44:7 51:18 law 8:19 9:8,18 9:22,23 10:3 11:15 12:25 13:2,7,12,24 14:1 28:22,23 32:3 33:24 37:25 38:18,18 52:11 55:23 57:17 58:11,22 58:22,24 lawyer 19:20,21 23:17 lawyers 14:24 14:25 19:15 leaf 13:18 legal 12:16 legitimate 22:16 lend 34:23	liar 60:21 list 16:8,10 18:9 18:15,17 20:21 21:1 24:4,10 27:14 40:11,13 44:7,13,14,17 45:9,14,20 51:18 listed 8:8,9 16:2 16:10 lists 16:7,8 18:9 20:18 21:2 57:2,3,23 literally 60:8 litigated 11:16 36:8,22,24 little 41:12 lived 60:14,15 60:16,18 long 14:25 35:24 55:9 look 4:16 7:17 7:21 8:1 10:24 10:25 25:9 26:17 34:9,24 39:2 43:6,12 45:1 52:4 56:4 56:21 59:11 60:12 looked 24:23 30:3,3 35:8 looking 3:23 25:6 30:7,17 39:4 43:7 49:1 looks 24:8 loses 57:12 lot 25:17 26:19 39:2 49:11 Louisiana 22:25 Louisville 7:7,8 low 59:24 lower 8:10 28:15 28:19 Lundy 18:16 43:24 44:15 45:13,14 47:2 47:4,13,16,22	48:1 Lundy's 44:9 46:13 lying 53:24 <hr/> M main 41:3,15 make-or-break 49:6,8 making 8:2 40:18 mandatory 34:13 Marilyn 15:17 46:16 marked 18:10 marker 18:11 Martha 60:6 matter 1:11 13:17 49:18 50:1 54:15 57:20 58:22 61:9 mean 5:12 6:12 7:6 12:24 14:24 19:24 25:15 26:7,23 39:11 45:24 50:20 51:7 56:24 60:12 meaningful 22:9 means 48:12 meant 53:23 mention 59:13 59:16 mentioned 59:15 merit 4:9,12 8:15 9:16 10:18 11:1,3,7 12:10,18 30:6 31:1,14 33:8 34:16,20,25 35:1,10,14 55:1 merits 4:3,13 12:8,11 13:10
--	--	--	---	--

13:16,20 34:24 35:12,12 38:21 57:7,11 Michigan 35:24 miles 60:14 Miller-El 22:5,8 23:24 60:2 mind 53:9,24 mine 51:10 minutes 59:2 misrepresenta... 20:21 misrepresenta... 26:21 27:11 misrepresented 26:4 Mississippi 23:19 mistake 44:4,4 misunderstan... 33:17 moment 17:9 Monday 1:9 months 40:4,6 59:18 morning 3:4,11 motion 18:1 19:3,8,19 20:16,25 40:7 40:9 47:24 52:2 59:18 motivated 23:2 23:8 move 19:16 moved 16:15 moving 9:14 multitude 34:1 murdering 53:9 mutually 8:1	60:9,13 never 5:10 19:3 19:20 20:5,5 21:3,19 35:3,3 35:6 41:12,23 41:24 47:17,17 53:23 new 11:7 12:20 13:8,8 18:1 19:19 20:16 25:20,22 26:3 26:13,17 27:17 27:18,18 39:2 40:6 44:5 47:25 52:2 55:25,25 56:9 56:9,11,19 58:11,18 59:18 59:19 nice 33:4 Nichols 29:14 non-death-only 34:1 Norfolk 28:13 normally 32:16 North 5:15,17 7:2,4 NOs 16:8,11 20:21 27:14 noted 48:11 notes 18:17 19:16,18,23,25 20:1,1,6,10 26:20,20 27:7 27:8,16 39:15 44:9 46:8,8,11 46:13 48:10 50:7,16,16,18 50:21 51:15,23 51:25 52:4 54:19 57:21 November 1:9 52:2 novo 12:2 number 37:25 52:24 53:2 numerous 24:21	Nunnemaker 4:16 <hr/> O <hr/> O 2:1 3:1 obtained 20:2 obviously 33:25 37:4 43:2 56:18 office 44:21 oh 17:25 50:10 53:25 okay 14:10 15:17 27:19 31:22,23 32:10 32:18 34:14 35:16 38:24 39:1 42:4 43:23 54:6,21 55:11 56:14 Oklahoma 10:10,11 older 49:1 once 7:3 56:8 ones 25:11 42:17 open 20:3 32:14 52:11 openness 20:25 opinion 8:12 22:25 28:14,23 32:11 opinions 4:5 8:4 opposed 19:17 opposition 14:5 option 6:20 oral 1:11 2:2,5 3:6 28:1 order 10:9,12 16:2 original 25:18 originally 3:18 ought 5:7 out-and-out 45:24 overall 26:12 48:25 overarching	27:12 overcome 9:5,20 55:13 overturn 56:18 <hr/> P <hr/> P 3:1 page 2:2 8:23 9:20 13:3 46:11 48:8 54:11,17 59:12 pages 20:19 paper 44:23 papers 18:23 paragraph 54:13,16 55:2 parcel 18:24 part 18:24 23:2 42:23 48:9 particular 37:15 particularly 39:17 53:1 60:24 party 24:14,15 patently 32:23 pattern 18:25 pause 24:25 penalty 16:14 pending 37:14 38:11 people 16:5,9 23:11 27:20 38:25 39:7 43:14 45:12 50:13 53:1,9 peremptory 23:1 25:5 49:13,15 50:3 50:8 period 43:12 permits 38:2 perpetuity 60:1 person 24:23 25:6 43:7 44:15 57:11 personal 23:17 23:18,18	petition 3:18 6:11 7:16 Petitioner 1:4,16 2:4,10 3:7 9:4 9:19 28:7 46:9 54:19 57:12 59:4 Petitioner's 28:12 phony 50:24 51:1 phrase 6:14 pick 43:22 picture 15:21 place 15:16 30:17 plausible 50:23 play 42:8 please 3:9 28:4 point 10:2 13:6 14:9 19:1 42:24 51:10 52:13 55:13 60:5 pointed 23:9 45:6 police 7:8 position 26:16 29:2 positive 4:1 34:21 possible 24:16 44:19 possibly 22:24 27:4 46:5 posture 6:8 potential 15:18 Powell 21:5 practice 15:3 practiced 14:25 practitioners 5:20 precedent 52:25 precise 36:11 preference 23:17,18,19 preliminary
<hr/> N <hr/> N 2:1,1 3:1 name 46:12 Navy 61:3 necessarily 53:4 necessary 14:19 neighborhood	numerous 24:21			

<p>8:21 57:20 preparation 19:11 prepared 18:17 preparing 40:23 present 14:18 presented 12:21 pretext 17:14 22:11 52:22 pretextual 24:9 pretty 14:2 28:23 29:1 previously 40:5 prior 24:21 40:4 40:6,8 46:14 46:14 47:9 48:11 priorities 16:17 prisoner 32:17 probable 4:7,20 31:13 probably 16:15 probation 61:1 problem 23:10 28:20 procedural 12:25 procedurally 57:4 proceedings 52:10 process 16:13 34:5,6,9,11 38:5 45:19 produce 11:21 11:24 product 52:9 program 42:9 promised 42:7 prong 13:2 properly 50:4 prosecuted 53:7 prosecution 16:18 19:17 57:10 59:19 prosecution's 19:16</p>	<p>prosecutor 15:1 15:8 17:16 19:18 20:9,11 24:3,22 26:4,9 27:2 39:17 43:15,17 46:2 47:8,23,25 49:16,20 50:5 52:3 53:17,21 60:3 prosecutor's 18:25 27:8,16 prosecutors 3:10 14:12,16 20:4,7 21:10 24:14 27:21 39:4 45:13,15 45:17 prosecutors' 50:7 prospective 3:12 15:18 39:5 40:12 provide 32:21 46:22 provided 60:20 Pullen 20:17 punished 53:15 purported 49:12 purpose 43:8 49:9 purposeful 49:16 54:20 put 9:6 19:7 27:22 43:19 61:1 puts 43:21 putting 7:13 27:14 51:20</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">Q</p> <hr/> <p>question 3:14 5:16 8:21,22 9:8,17,22,23 10:4,8,12,24 13:1,24 22:5,7 22:22 24:1</p>	<p>28:10 29:17,24 33:4 36:5 37:9 37:20 38:6,14 38:17 49:14 50:3,5,6 54:3,4 55:12 questioning 15:23 questions 24:24 25:1 29:22 38:3 52:15,21 53:1,3 60:4,10 60:19 quick 8:5 36:5 60:5 quickly 59:5 quite 40:15 41:25 quoted 9:21 30:18 59:7</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">R</p> <hr/> <p>R 3:1 R.J 3:24 5:12,24 7:1 8:6,19 race 14:13 16:23 17:15 23:2,6,8 43:9 49:21,24 50:1 51:17 54:21 race-coded 18:8 race-neutral 14:20 racial 40:10,12 51:15 Railway 28:13 raise 41:15 raised 3:14 14:4 28:15,16 52:7 raises 51:9 ranked 16:16 ranking 44:25 rated 14:13 re-files 40:14 reach 12:20 54:18 read 23:12</p>	<p>28:22 30:20 32:3 48:12 54:11,17 55:2 ready 21:7 real 41:11 42:1 really 4:23 6:17 13:19 21:21 23:4 39:7 42:10 43:15 49:18 50:5,13 reason 9:13 14:17 22:9,16 23:16,20 24:20 24:20 25:3,13 27:4 35:7 40:21 41:11 42:1 43:8 44:8 45:25 46:5 48:16 51:18 54:18,24 55:3 reasonable 24:5 39:22 40:1,3 43:7 reasoned 4:16 7:22 8:2 reasoning 6:3 reasons 21:15 21:21,22,24 22:1,6,6 23:12 23:13,15 24:4 24:9,11,12,16 25:12 26:5,6,8 26:19,22 42:3 42:12,13,25 43:1 46:1 49:19 50:19,23 51:1,1,17 57:25 59:12,19 60:1,1,2,3 REBUTTAL 2:8 59:3 recognized 23:24 record 43:19 46:7 51:5 53:18 54:9,12 61:3</p>	<p>records 20:3 35:9 52:11 54:19 redoing 12:14 Reed 29:13,19 reference 33:9 36:7 regard 15:12 26:21 37:8 44:8 53:4 59:6 60:4,6,24 regardless 51:17 regular 34:6,8 rehearing 29:4 37:17 rejects 38:6 relationship 52:18 relevant 25:9 26:18 relied 19:8 20:6 20:24 41:17 rely 19:25 relying 7:24 remain 33:3,7 remaining 59:2 remand 5:7 remember 7:6 30:19 renewed 55:1 rephrase 34:18 reply 48:5 reported 23:16 represented 21:4 request 52:11 requests 38:4 required 55:10 requiring 5:7 res 9:1,5,20 10:22 11:6,11 12:23 13:7,9 13:12 41:18 54:14 55:23,24 56:1,23 57:2 57:23,25 research 8:5</p>
--	--	--	--	---

resolution 12:25	43:4 44:20	40:7,9,9 43:15	Shirley 21:5	46:18,22,25
resolved 10:4	49:13,22 51:1	44:23 45:14	short 8:12	47:7,13,16,22
respect 3:15	52:2 56:25	48:8 52:3	show 19:22	52:14 53:8,14
21:17 50:8	58:21 60:8	54:17	27:11,12 50:16	53:18 56:6
respectfully	ring 31:3,5,7	scale 25:23	50:16 52:21	Sotomayor's
28:11	risk 53:17,20	Scalia 4:23 6:16	showed 20:25	24:1
respond 54:4	ROBERTS 3:3	10:20 11:5,10	shown 9:4,19	sound 51:16
Respondent	3:13 4:10 14:8	11:13,18,20	23:1	sounds 6:15
1:18 2:7 28:2	16:19,21 17:2	25:17 26:1,10	shows 45:8	54:21
57:21	27:24 28:9	26:24 27:7	side 19:25	spaghetti 42:11
response 9:11	31:12,20 46:21	29:22 32:19	similar 3:21	specifically 29:6
23:25 39:20	46:24 58:25	33:11,15 36:15	similarly 49:8	33:9
55:14	61:6	36:18,21 37:3	simply 24:13	speculation
responsible	Rome 14:25	38:9,14 50:22	43:20	39:23
44:12	round 27:9	51:4,7,9 56:12	singling 39:9	stand 60:3
rest 25:21	rule 4:6 13:16	Scalia's 13:23	situated 49:8	standard 23:22
restitution 61:2	22:15,21 31:16	school 60:15,16	situation 3:22	start 21:7 49:7
result 11:21,24	32:21 33:1	schools 60:8	5:13,23,24 6:2	60:10
returned 59:10	34:15,15,19	scope 4:11 37:7	9:8	state 4:3 5:22
reverse 5:4,9	39:10 49:16	score 45:1	six 16:10 59:18	8:11 9:8,12,18
25:20	58:10	scrutinize 24:11	sixth 16:12	9:22,23 10:3
reversing 4:24	ruled 5:14	search 18:5,15	Smith 29:14	10:22 12:25
review 4:11 5:3	rules 4:4,19 7:14	Sears 3:20 6:5	smoking 25:16	13:2 14:1,4
5:6,8,15 6:13	19:24	second 42:2 61:2	25:17,21,22	16:2,3,14
9:3,9 12:2	ruling 4:2 12:7	secondly 15:12	26:4	18:19 29:2,15
28:18,21 30:5	12:11 13:1	27:2 59:11	Snyder 22:25	30:4,8,9,10,13
30:5,14,25	58:8	section 57:5,6	23:23	32:9,15 34:5
34:13 35:23	run 51:10	see 14:20 19:25	social 26:25 27:2	34:14 35:22
36:25 38:10,12	running 21:3	35:10 39:13	59:21,22	36:3 37:24
56:10,11		45:20	somebody 21:9	38:6,18 41:17
reviewable 8:25	S	seen 19:20	53:22	41:18,20 47:11
57:2,22	S 2:1 3:1	select 14:14	son 53:5,7	48:23 52:10
reviewing 28:6	S.E.2d 29:14,15	selection 3:11	sorry 30:24 34:2	54:8,15 57:17
revisited 58:11	29:20	19:9 47:21	35:5 46:23	State's 28:16
Reynolds 3:24	sat 21:12	48:12	56:6 58:4,6	56:19
5:12,24 7:1 8:6	saying 5:25 6:4	self-contradict...	sort 19:21 37:7	stated 28:23
8:19	11:6 18:12	43:2	40:16 51:4	statement 18:14
Richter 37:6,7	19:21 26:11	sentence 57:8,9	SOTOMAYOR	45:25 57:20
right 4:25 7:19	27:6 31:6	57:9,11	12:1,7,13	states 1:1,12
11:18,18,20,22	33:17,17 53:12	separate 57:5	16:20 17:20,23	13:4 15:5
11:23,25 14:22	59:21,22	separately 15:22	18:13,21 19:10	28:14 32:15
15:24 24:2,22	says 6:12 20:14	separating	19:14 22:12,14	38:5 48:24
27:17 29:1	22:8 23:23	27:12	22:19 28:20	59:25
31:18,18,22	24:22 25:8	serious 23:10	29:18 34:2,5,8	statute 6:12 29:5
34:17,22,22	29:6 30:4,5	served 61:3	34:14,21,23	29:5 30:3,3,13
36:1,9,24 37:3	32:11 33:1	serves 60:22	35:5,11,16,18	30:20,23,25
38:22 41:1,21	34:15,19 38:12	sham 22:10	38:19 45:11	31:25 32:11

<p>38:1 statutes 4:5 statutory 6:14 stealing 53:8,12 step 9:15 12:3 12:20 STEPHEN 1:15 2:3,9 3:6 59:3 stomach 42:10 strange 11:10 strict 19:17 strike 3:11 15:3 15:25 16:1,7,8 16:15,16 21:2 21:11 23:1,7 25:5 26:24 27:5 40:7 47:12 49:13,15 49:24 50:1,3 strikes 15:1,14 23:7 39:17 43:19 46:10,14 48:22,23 50:9 51:15 59:15 striking 16:5,18 16:22,23 17:15 22:6,7,17 24:4 45:21 59:13 strong 42:21 56:20 struck 17:3,16 17:17 19:6 22:3 45:18,18 46:1 47:6 49:9 50:5,19 59:23 students 60:9 submit 21:20 submitted 54:19 61:7,9 subsequent 8:6 25:9 substantial 23:2 23:4 suffice 26:14 sufficient 9:5,19 11:14 13:9,14 suggest 22:24</p>	<p>23:3,22 25:14 57:24 suggesting 22:10 22:21 suggestion 19:3 suggests 24:10 39:3,9 summarily 4:21 4:21 superior 6:20 8:10,23 9:7 56:18 support 49:13 49:14 supported 21:23 50:2 supports 53:19 54:13 suppose 24:19 32:19 supposed 51:21 supreme 1:1,12 3:19,21 4:3,20 4:25 5:1,5,15 5:17,22 6:7,15 7:5,16,20 8:7 8:11 15:5 26:23 28:17,17 29:8,10,24 30:5,15 31:17 35:20 36:25 37:10,14,20,22 38:2,6,11,15 38:17 52:7 58:10,16 sure 6:19 27:16 36:6 38:23 44:5 51:21 57:18 surely 50:24 surprised 19:10 40:15 surprising 41:12 suspect 24:12 sustained 23:3</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">T</p> <hr/>	<p>T 2:1,1 take 7:9 12:22 15:15 33:1 34:15,19,20 35:4,10 39:8 53:21 55:8 taken 15:20,21 23:14,15 32:15 50:18 takes 30:13 talked 18:17 20:10 talking 18:7 talks 57:1 teachers 60:7 television 42:9 tell 5:5 20:13 41:14,24 43:10 tells 26:4 42:5 terms 16:17 21:21,21 test 20:7 testified 19:19 46:17 47:20,25 testify 19:22,25 46:20 48:5 testimony 50:25 Thank 14:9,10 27:24 32:18 36:13 58:25 59:1,5 61:6 Thanks 14:8 theme 48:25 they'd 19:6 thing 15:10 19:2 20:17 24:19 59:25 things 21:18,20 37:8,25 40:23 46:13 think 4:10,14 6:14 7:11 8:18 8:19 9:13 10:7 11:5,8,8 12:9,9 12:13,16 14:2 14:6,9 15:3 18:18 24:8,9</p>	<p>24:18 28:21 29:3,8 30:11 31:20 33:6,6 34:19 35:8,13 37:18,23,23,24 38:16 39:14,15 42:13,15,22 43:7,11 44:6 44:24,25 46:7 47:10,10 49:3 49:5,6,23 50:15 51:13,14 52:13,24 53:2 53:25 54:14 55:3,9,13,16 55:20,22,24 56:4,11,22,24 58:7 59:17 thinking 49:16 49:20 53:24 thinnest 13:8 Thompson 7:7 thought 11:13 41:12,23,24 45:19 three 9:15 12:4 12:20 16:7,24 16:24 17:16,17 17:18,18 27:20 44:18 45:12 time 8:4 14:25 16:21 21:13 27:23 43:12,18 43:18 46:3,5 47:1,20 48:13 50:18 51:12 54:3 58:12,14 59:14,23 60:6 times 23:5 48:13 52:25 TIMOTHY 1:3 tip 25:23 tired 42:7 43:6 Tobacco 3:24 told 20:23 45:11 48:1 tolerable 23:8</p>	<p>tonight 42:6 total 50:6 totally 4:5 31:1 43:2 transcript 43:14 48:9 treated 60:21 treating 27:13 trial 6:11,21 17:24 18:1,21 18:23 19:3,16 19:19 20:16,22 20:23,24 26:18 27:3 40:4,6,8 40:14 47:1,5 47:25 48:6 50:18 52:2,3 59:8,18 troubled 52:16 52:16 trump 32:1 trying 48:23 turned 51:24 52:1,9,12 turns 21:8 26:7 26:8 twice 47:20 two 7:14 9:6 14:22 23:14 25:12 26:25 27:21 28:5 29:13 33:9 39:19 40:8 41:22 45:13,15 45:16 57:24 59:2 typically 4:18 TYRONE 1:3</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">U</p> <hr/> <p>U.S 6:6 23:19 ultimately 38:14 38:16 unceasing 23:6 unclear 36:2 48:14 55:16,20 undercut 44:2</p>
--	---	--	---	--

underlying 8:22 14:1	25:22 26:14 39:13	59:14	Z	4
undermine 39:16	voir 16:13 22:9 46:3,4,6,10,14 48:1 53:1,3	white 17:17,18 18:3 22:1,2 49:8	0	40 42:3,25 43:1 409 29:14,21 47 13:4
underprivileged 49:7	<hr/> W <hr/>	willing 15:8	1	<hr/> 5 <hr/>
understand 4:23 24:25 27:16 56:12	wait 30:16,16,16 42:24	window 56:2	10:04 1:13 3:2	550 29:15
understanding 13:12,13,14 18:14 33:24	want 5:19,20 13:5,19 21:15 21:19 39:6,7 42:5,6,11 47:2 47:14,17 48:25	wins 38:12	105 48:2	56 59:12
uniform 33:18	51:16 54:2	wipe 13:9	11:05 61:8	561 6:6
uniformly 33:12	55:14 60:5	women 16:24 17:3,8,13,15 17:18,18,18	112 48:2	57 59:12
United 1:1,12 13:4 15:5 59:25	wanted 20:22 21:14 50:13	word 32:2	14 48:5	59 2:10
upheld 23:20 26:24	wants 46:9	words 4:11 15:20 30:6,19 30:19 31:9,11 31:12 32:12 40:17 49:15	14-8349 1:4 3:4	<hr/> 6 <hr/>
upset 42:10	WARDEN 1:6	work 52:9	168 20:12	<hr/> 7 <hr/>
Upton 3:20 6:6	Washington 1:8	worker 26:25 27:2 59:21,22	175 8:23 57:20	7:00 42:7
use 20:18 32:25	wasn't 14:3 23:18 40:15 59:22	Working 49:7	179 40:10,11	75 13:4
<hr/> V <hr/>	watch 42:6	worst 55:7	18 48:20 60:14	79 49:2
v 1:5 3:4,20,24 4:15 6:5 7:2,7 10:10,25,25 15:5 22:25 28:13 29:13,14 29:19 35:24 37:6,16 59:25	way 7:6 8:8 29:11 33:13,19 44:3 53:10 59:17	wouldn't 19:4 49:11	180 61:1,2	<hr/> 8 <hr/>
valid 21:21 25:13 42:4,16 42:20 49:13,15 49:19	ways 21:14 39:20	writ 4:3 5:16 11:2	19 48:20	<hr/> 9 <hr/>
venire 21:7	we'll 3:3 34:15	writing 5:19 19:8	19-14-52 32:15	9-14-52 30:11 31:21
veracity 20:7	we're 8:12,14 9:14 34:25 37:5 40:7 43:15 49:1 51:19	written 46:12	192 9:2,20 54:11	945 6:6
verbatim 23:14 23:15	we've 7:14 35:8	wrong 5:5 30:17 32:23 43:10,20 44:5 58:21	195 54:17	
verdict 59:10	weekend 3:24 8:5 15:22,24	wrote 8:12 20:5 44:16 46:13,15	196 54:17	
versus 57:10	weeks 40:8	<hr/> X <hr/>	1960 7:7	
victim 49:2 60:18	went 4:3 55:11 61:2,3	x 1:2,7	1975 29:7,21	
view 32:21 35:19 54:13	weren't 16:22 51:23 60:17	<hr/> Y <hr/>	198 48:20	
violate 57:10	Western 28:13	yards 60:15	199 29:15	
violation 8:24	whatsoever	year 7:2,3,12 15:4 43:13	1999 29:15	
		years 41:6,25	1st 59:9	
		Yist 4:15	<hr/> 2 <hr/>	
		younger 48:25 49:5	2 1:9	
			20 7:10 60:14	
			200 60:15	
			2006 20:1	
			2010 3:21 6:6	
			2015 1:9 7:2	
			219 29:14,20	
			23 48:24	
			250 60:15	
			256 46:11	
			270 29:15	
			28 2:7	
			<hr/> 3 <hr/>	
			3 2:4	
			30s 48:19	
			34 48:24	
			36 31:16	