

1       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

2       - - - - - x

3       OBB PERSONENVERKEHR AG, :  
4              Petitioner : No. 13-1067

5       v. :  
6       CAROL P. SACHS. :  
7       - - - - - x

8              Washington, D.C.

9              Monday, October 5, 2015

10

11              The above-entitled matter came on for oral  
12          argument before the Supreme Court of the United States  
13          at 10:04 a.m.

14          APPEARANCES:

15          JUAN C. BASOMBRIJO, ESQ., Costa Mesa, Cal.; on behalf  
16          of Petitioner.

17          EDWIN S. KNEEDLER, ESQ., Deputy Attorney General,  
18          Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of  
19          United States, as amicus curiae, supporting reversal.

20          JEFFREY L. FISHER, ESQ., Stanford, Cal.; on behalf of  
21          Respondent.

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (10:02 a.m.)

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument  
4 first this morning, first this term, in Case 13-1067,  
5 OBB Personenverkehr v. Sachs.

6 Mr. Basombrio.

7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JUAN C. BASOMBARIO

8 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

9 MR. BASOMBARIO: Mr. Chief Justice, and may  
10 it please the Court:

11 This personal injury action is based upon an  
12 accident that occurred in Austria. If this Court  
13 agrees, there's no need to reach the other question  
14 related to agency, so I will start first with the  
15 based-upon issue.

16 In Nelson, this Court set forth a framework  
17 to analyze the based-upon question. And this Court held  
18 that courts must begin their analysis by identifying the  
19 particular conduct on which the action is based. The  
20 decision uses words such as basis, foundation, and  
21 gravamen. So here --

22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But in -- in that case,  
23 there was a distinction between State activity -- that  
24 is, police activity -- and the commercial activity in  
25 hiring the plaintiff. Here, I think it's conceded that

1       the activity -- running a railroad -- that's commercial.

2       So we don't have the commercial/State action division.

3                    MR. BASOMBRIOS:                  Yes, Your Honor, that's  
4       correct. Here, there are two alleged commercial  
5       activities. One of them is the sale of the ticket in  
6       the United States, and the other one are the acts and  
7       omissions that resulted in the accident in Austria.

8                    So what I would suggest is that we look at  
9       the complaint and see what it is that the plaintiff has  
10      alleged.

11                  JUSTICE KENNEDY:                  Just as a matter of  
12      background, suppose a hypothetical case -- no foreign  
13      sovereign. It was a private corporation in Austria.  
14      Would there then be jurisdiction under the Due Process  
15      Clause in your view? You don't have to prevail on -- on  
16      that issue, but as a background issue, what -- do you  
17      have a position?

18                  MR. BASOMBRIOS:                  Our position is that if OBB  
19      was a private entity, there would not be jurisdiction  
20      over OBB. There would not be general jurisdiction after  
21      this Court holding in Daimler and there would also --

22                  JUSTICE KENNEDY:                  And Daimler is your best  
23      case for that proposition?

24                  MR. BASOMBRIOS:                  Yes, Your Honor.

25                  JUSTICE KAGAN:                  Do -- do you think that it's

1 the same test? In other words, is the test a specific  
2 jurisdiction test here, based-on, arising-from, that we  
3 are basically asking the same question as we would be  
4 asking if this were a -- a foreign corporation?

5 MR. BASOMBRIO: I don't believe so, Your  
6 Honor. Let me explain, if I may, why not. Congress  
7 could have chosen that wording in the personal  
8 jurisdiction analysis in the case law, but they decided  
9 on another phrase, based-upon, instead. So I believe  
10 that what this Court needs to do is give some  
11 guidance --

12 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, the why -- I mean, it  
13 doesn't seem to me that that wording is very different  
14 from the wording that we've used in specific  
15 jurisdiction cases. The wording here is "based on" --  
16 we've used "arising out of." Sometimes we've used  
17 "related to." In some respects -- I mean, it's pretty  
18 clear that the FSIA is meant to ensure that when a  
19 foreign government is acting as a commercial actor, it  
20 gets treated like a foreign corporation. And the  
21 language here is very similar, right? There's the  
22 insistence on a sufficient contact, a minimum contact,  
23 and then there is the insistence on a particular kind of  
24 relationship between that contact -- contact and the  
25 claim.

1           So it seems -- I guess the question is:           Why  
2        should we think of these two questions as at all  
3        different? And I don't know, by the way, I mean, that  
4        it would hurt you if they were the same, because it  
5        might just be there would be no specific jurisdiction  
6        here, you know? But I guess I'm having trouble of  
7        thinking why it is that there -- that there would be a  
8        different test.

9           MR. BASOMBARIO:           The reason why is because  
10       the FSIA takes place of the -- both the subject matter  
11       jurisdiction analysis and the personal jurisdiction  
12       analysis. Both are combined into one test. So although  
13       I would agree certainly that some aspects of the  
14       personal jurisdictional analysis are part of that test,  
15       it goes beyond that. It also goes into subject matter  
16       jurisdiction which is a different set of policy  
17       determinations that Congress made that are in some way  
18       overlapping of the personal jurisdiction questions, but  
19       I don't think they're completely aligned.

20           JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:       I'm -- I'm sorry.  
21       I'm -- I don't even understand why we're talking about  
22       based-upon.

23           As Justice Ginsburg said, there's no dispute  
24       here that whether the based-upon is the ticket sale or  
25       the operation of the train, both of them are commercial

1       activities.

2           Isn't the work in substantial contact with  
3       the United States? Isn't that what we should be looking  
4       at instead? Was this commercial activity substantial  
5       enough? The operation of the train and the ticket sale  
6       here, did it have a substantial contact with the  
7       United States?

8           MR. BASOMBRIOS:           There's a three-step  
9       analysis, Your Honor, in Nelson. First, you have to  
10      identify the particular conduct, the actions, not the  
11      causes of action, which is what the en banc court did.  
12      They focused on the legal claims.

13           This Court said you have to focus on the  
14      acts. Here, the acts --

15           JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:           So we did that in the  
16      context of deciding when something was a sovereign act  
17      as opposed to a commercial act. We know this is a  
18      commercial act.

19           So -- and we -- I'm just confused.           Why  
20      isn't the work -- why shouldn't the work be done by  
21      substantial contact with the U.S.?

22           MR. BASOMBRIOS:           It's a three-step analysis.  
23      First, you identify the activity. Secondly, you decide  
24      whether it is commercial or not.

25           JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:           Whether it's --

1           MR. BASOMBRIOS:           And third, whether there's  
2 substantial contact.

3           JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:        -- commercial or  
4 sovereign.

5           MR. BASOMBRIOS:          So there are three steps.

6           What I'm saying is that the Ninth Circuit  
7 erred. They didn't look at the conduct first. They  
8 looked at the legal claims. If you look at the --

9           JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:        Even if they had looked  
10 at the conduct, it's commercial.

11          MR. BASOMBRIOS:         It's commercial. But if you  
12 look at the conduct and you identify it as the accident  
13 in Austria -- which is what the plaintiff claimed. In  
14 JA 15, paragraphs 3 to 8, they alleged that there was an  
15 unsafe boarding platform, a gap at the platform,  
16 et cetera, et cetera.

17          All of these things happened in Austria --

18          JUSTICE ALITO:            But how do you propose --  
19 how do you propose that we determine whether it's based  
20 on commercial activity?

21          Take their failure-to-warn claim.           Why isn't  
22 that based on something that occurred in the  
23 United States? You're just -- are you just asking us  
24 to -- to step back and say, well, in that case we -- we  
25 really think they're just trying -- they have a -- they

1 have a tort that occurred in Austria, a negligence tort  
2 that occurred in Austria, and they're just trying to  
3 plead around it with these other claims?

4 MR. BASOMBRIOS: Well, there's no allegation  
5 in the Complaint that the failure to warn was something  
6 that happened in the United States. It's found in the  
7 same set of paragraphs, 3 through 8, that relate to the  
8 acts and omissions in Austria.

9 It also would make no sense to argue that  
10 there was a failure to warn in the United States because  
11 that would mean that the Eurail Pass itself would have  
12 to warn about all conditions at hundreds of potential  
13 railroad stations in Europe.

14 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, it might be -- it  
15 might be a claim that couldn't prevail, but why does  
16 that answer the question?

17 MR. BASOMBRIOS: Well, the failure to warn  
18 that's alleged relates to the facts that arise in  
19 Austria, and, therefore, the cause of action arises in  
20 Austria because that's where the acts or omissions  
21 occurred if -- if one looks at what's alleged in the  
22 Complaint itself.

23 JUSTICE KAGAN: Would -- would you agree  
24 and -- and, as you've been doing, take out the agency  
25 question -- but would you agree if -- if what had

1       happened here was that the ticket was not honored. You  
2       know, the plaintiff bought a ticket, and the ticket was  
3       not honored, and -- and the suit was where the ticket  
4       was purchased, would you agree that that's based-on?

5            MR. BASOMBRIO:           If this was a breach of  
6       contract case --

7            JUSTICE KAGAN:          Just a breach of contract  
8       case.

9            MR. BASOMBRIO:          -- and the breach -- the  
10       allegation of the breach was that when the Respondent  
11       showed up they did not honor the ticket, that would be  
12       based upon an activity in Austria because it's in  
13       Austria that that ticket got honored.

14           JUSTICE KAGAN:          In Austria, even though she  
15       bought the ticket in the United States? You think even  
16       the breach of contract case could not be brought in the  
17       United States?

18           MR. BASOMBRIO:          Correct, because the -- the  
19       wrongful act, the breach, arises in Austria.

20           CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:    What about --

21           JUSTICE KENNEDY:         Suppose we disagree  
22       with that --

23           MR. BASOMBRIO:          I'm sorry?

24           JUSTICE KENNEDY:         Suppose we disagree with  
25       that answer? Do you lose the case?

1           MR. BASOMBRIOS:           I'm sorry?

2           JUSTICE KENNEDY:           Suppose we disagree with  
3           the answer that you gave to Justice Kagan. Suppose we  
4           disagree that that suit has to be in Austria. Can you  
5           still prevail on the facts of this case?

6           The hypothetical was the ticket is not  
7           honored. Suppose we disagree with your answer. Can you  
8           still prevail on the facts that it -- that it did, in  
9           fact, occur in this case?

10          MR. BASOMBRIOS:           Yes, but I would still  
11          prevail based on the agency argument that we have  
12          presented.

13          JUSTICE SCALIA:           But you --

14          JUSTICE KAGAN:           Could you go back and  
15          explain to me what -- I'm sorry.

16          JUSTICE SCALIA:           You -- you'd lose on -- on  
17          the other point.

18          MR. BASOMBRIOS:           Well --

19          JUSTICE SCALIA:           You -- you acknowledge that  
20          you would lose on the other point if -- if that  
21          hypothetical came out the other way?

22          MR. BASOMBRIOS:           No, I do not.

23          JUSTICE SCALIA:           Oh.

24          MR. BASOMBRIOS:           I believe -- let me clarify,  
25          Your Honor, if I may.

1           My answer to Justice -- Justice Kagan was  
2       that I believe that a breach of contract claim for  
3       dishonor of the ticket in Austria has to be brought in  
4       Austria.

5           JUSTICE KAGAN:                  Because --

6           MR. BASOMBRI:                  Justice -- because that's  
7       where the breach occurred that gives rise to the cause  
8       of action.

9           Justice Kennedy said to me, suppose that we  
10      disagree with you, can you still win the case? And my  
11      answer was, I could still win, I believe, under the  
12      agency alternative argument.

13           JUSTICE SCALIA:                  But not --

14           JUSTICE KAGAN:                  What about apart --

15           JUSTICE SCALIA:                  -- not under -- under the  
16      argument you're -- you're first making?

17           MR. BASOMBRI:                  Not if the Court ruled  
18      against me, no. But I believe --

19           JUSTICE SCALIA:                  On that -- why? Why? I  
20      mean, couldn't -- couldn't you make the argument that  
21      the question ought to be decided not -- not by where  
22      the -- where the contract was breached but where the  
23      contract was made? I mean, we could hold -- we could  
24      hold that, and that would not affect your case.

25           MR. BASOMBRI:                  That's true. I -- I do not

1 believe that a breach of contract claim under the fact  
2 scenario that you provided, Your Honor, would give rise  
3 to a claim in the United States because the breach  
4 happened -- would have happened in Austria.

5 JUSTICE SCALIA: Counsel, I want to come  
6 back to Justice Kagan's speculation of -- of whether  
7 based-on is -- is nothing more than due process.

8 It seems to me that the definition of  
9 commercial activity carried on in the United States by a  
10 foreign state is the due process test. The definition  
11 is, "A commercial activity carried on in the  
12 United States by a foreign state means commercial  
13 activity carried on by such state and having substantial  
14 contact with the United States." That sounds to me  
15 like -- like the due process test.

16 But what is required here is not just a  
17 commercial activity carried on in the United States, it  
18 has to be based on a commercial activity carried on in  
19 the United States. And it seems to me that is  
20 something -- something added to the -- to the  
21 constitutional test.

22 MR. BASOMBRIOS: Yes, Your Honor. And that's  
23 why I started my discussion by referring to this  
24 holding -- the holding of this Court in Nelson which has  
25 to look at the particular conduct.

1           The particular conduct at issue is not the  
2    sale of the ticket, it's the acts and omissions that  
3    resulted in the accident in Austria.

4           CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:                   What -- what if  
5    there are acts or omissions in two -- let's say you have  
6    a flight from New York to Vienna. And in New York,  
7    someone negligently sets or whatever they do with the  
8    landing gear, okay?

9           So then the plane takes off, and then in  
10   Vienna, because of the negligence in New York, it's a  
11   rough landing, somebody gets a concussion.

12          MR. BASOMBRIO:                       Uh-huh.

13          CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:                   Where is the  
14    gravamen of the action in that case? Can you bring that  
15    in -- in the United States?

16          MR. BASOMBRIO:                       Potentially, you could bring  
17    it in the United States. And the difference between  
18    your scenario and this case is that in that scenario,  
19    the service was provided, started in -- starting in the  
20   United States. There's contact with the United States  
21   because the foreign airline came here and conducted a  
22   commercial activity in the United States.

23          JUSTICE GINSBURG:                     Because it's --

24          MR. BASOMBRIO:                       That's what different--

25          JUSTICE GINSBURG:                     -- a typical tort. If

1       the negligence occurs in one place, and the impact is  
2       the other, you could bring the suit in either place, as  
3       far as our notions of personal jurisdictions, either  
4       injury in the state or conduct in the state causing  
5       injury outside it. Those are typical long-arm bases of  
6       jurisdictions.

7                   So the Chief's hypothetical where the  
8       negligence occurred in the United States, that you agree  
9       would be a case that could be brought in the  
10      United States because the relevant conduct occurred  
11      there.

12                  MR. BASOMBRIO:                   Correct, in that case --

13                  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:             Well, correct. I  
14       don't understand, then, what gravamen means in the  
15       Nelson decision. Gravamen means one place, right?

16                  MR. BASOMBRIO:                   Right.

17                  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:             Or do you think you  
18       could have a lot of different -- I mean, if it's the  
19       gravamen of your complaint, I think you have to choose,  
20       don't you, one or the other?

21                  MR. BASOMBRIO:                   Well, I would -- I was -- I  
22       would understand your example, Chief Justice, to mean  
23       that the act that caused the injury was whatever they  
24       didn't do upon takeoff to the plane, or -- or -- as I  
25       understood your example, that cause of that injury was

1       in the United States.

2                   CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:                   So can you have more  
3       than one place under the based-upon analysis in Nelson,  
4       or has you -- have you got to decide there's only one  
5       place where you could bring the action?

6                   MR. BASOMBRIO:                   Well, the airline example --  
7       and this is something I thought about. It's somewhat a  
8       complicated example because we have conventions,  
9       international treaties that deal with -- with airline  
10      cases.

11                  I would imagine that, theoretically, there  
12      could be one more -- more than one location, but not on  
13      the facts of this case.

14                  JUSTICE ALITO:                   In the Chief Justice's  
15      example, he -- he stated that there was negligence in  
16      the United States. But what if there's no evidence of  
17      that?

18                  There's a -- there's a problem with the  
19      landing gear when the plane lands in Austria, and the  
20      claim is that there was a failure to inspect in the  
21      United States, or a failure to do proper maintenance in  
22      the United States. Would that be different?

23                  MR. BASOMBRIO:                   That may be different.  
24       Again, because the transportation was provided from the  
25       United States geographically, there -- there is no doubt

1       in that question that commercial act was carried on in  
2       the United States by the airline. And that's different  
3       here.

4                                  JUSTICE SCALIA:                   I suppose it's -- it's --  
5       it's proper to say that where you have negligence that  
6       causes an injury, the -- the complaint is based on both.  
7       You -- you don't have liability without the negligence.  
8       You don't have liability without the injury. So why  
9       can't you say based-on, in -- in that situation, would  
10      enable either one to -- to sustain the cause of action?

11                                 MR. BASOMBRIO:                 In the airplane example,  
12      perhaps either jurisdiction. In this example, if you  
13      look at the Complaint -- and we're guided by the  
14      allegations of the Complaint, it is -- the acts are only  
15      alleged to have happened and the omissions to have  
16      happened --

17                                 JUSTICE KENNEDY:                 Getting back to our  
18      earlier discussion, questions from me and from Justice  
19      Kagan, it seemed to me you have to say the due process  
20      analysis is insufficient under this statute because --  
21      then fill in the blank. And Justice Scalia was asking  
22      you the same question.

23                                 MR. BASOMBRIO:                 Yeah.

24                                 JUSTICE KENNEDY:                 One -- one answer might be  
25      because otherwise there would be no necessity for a

1       statute. Due process applies anyway. But the  
2       counterargument is, well, there has to be because the  
3       statute makes the distinction between sovereign and  
4       commercial and so it has a real purpose.

5                    MR. BASOMBRIOS:           Right. The due process  
6       analysis is incorporated into the statute, but it's not  
7       the only thing to think about. For example --

8                    JUSTICE GINSBURG:          You did answer, I  
9       think -- you did answer, rendering Justice Kennedy's  
10      question somewhat academic, that there would be no  
11      specific jurisdiction in the United States if all that  
12      happened here was a ticket purchase from an agent where  
13      the injurious conduct occurred abroad and the railroad  
14      operates solely abroad.

15                  You answered that whether it were the due  
16      process specific jurisdiction inquiry or the Foreign  
17      Sovereign Immunities Act, the answer would be the same,  
18      that the ticket sale in the United States was not  
19      enough.

20                  MR. BASOMBRIOS:           Yes, Your Honor.

21                  JUSTICE KENNEDY:           But, of course, my  
22      question was suppose that the due process analysis is  
23      sufficient to sustain jurisdiction. Then what? Then  
24      does based-on still have a separate meaning as a  
25      separate requirement that has to be met and has not been

1 met here? And if so, why?

2 MR. BASOMBRIOS: It has not been met here  
3 because from a general jurisdictional perspective --

4 JUSTICE KAGAN: But not general  
5 jurisdiction.

6 MR. BASOMBRIOS: Right.

7 JUSTICE KAGAN: I was really talking about  
8 specific jurisdiction. And, of course, Justice Scalia  
9 is absolutely right with respect to general  
10 jurisdiction, that all you look at is the contacts. But  
11 with respect to specific jurisdiction -- this is a  
12 company that doesn't have pervasive contacts --

13 MR. BASOMBRIOS: Right.

14 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- it's critical to the due  
15 process analysis that there be a relationship, and a  
16 real relationship between the particular contact with  
17 the United States and the lawsuit in the exact same way  
18 that this statute focuses on.

19 And so, again, I don't know if it hurts you.

20 It might be, as Justice Ginsburg says, that there  
21 wouldn't be specific jurisdiction here for a  
22 corporation. But -- but -- but why shouldn't we treat  
23 those two things exactly the same way?

24 MR. BASOMBRIOS: There is -- there is -- if I  
25 may answer that two parts of your question. First,

1       there is no specific jurisdiction if OBB were a private  
2       entity because the Respondent is not suing for breach of  
3       the ticket; it's not alleging that it was not honored.  
4       She's suing for something that happened in Austria. The  
5       specific acts happened outside the United States.

6                  JUSTICE KAGAN:                   Yes. Well, that's an answer  
7       for why there is no specific jurisdiction here.

8                  MR. BASOMBRI:                   Right.

9                  JUSTICE KAGAN:                   And you can make the exact  
10      same answer in the completely private context. And  
11      you --

12                 MR. BASOMBRI:                   Right.

13                 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- could well be right.               I'm  
14      want to ask Mr. Fisher about that.

15                 MR. BASOMBRI:                   Right.

16                 JUSTICE KAGAN:                   But it's not an answer for  
17      why the tests should be different.

18                 MR. BASOMBRI:                   The test -- the test -- my  
19      belief is that the test should incorporate due process  
20      analysis. But because we are also dealing with subject  
21      matter jurisdiction, which is a different analysis than  
22      personal jurisdiction, there are other policy  
23      considerations.

24                 The policy considerations decisions that  
25      Congress made were based on territory. If one want --

1 if one looks at the first, the second, and the third  
2 clause, they're all territory-based distinctions. In --  
3 in the case Amerada Hess, this Court held that tort  
4 actions are meant to be encompassed by the second  
5 section of the -- of the exception, the non --  
6 noncommercial torts exception. That requires that the  
7 tort happened in the United States in order to be -- to  
8 have subject matter on personal jurisdiction. It  
9 wouldn't fit here.

10 Justice Ginsburg referred to direct effects.  
11 That would come under the third clause, which deals with  
12 commercial activity outside of the U.S.; again, a  
13 territorial line, having an effect here.

14 The first clause draws the territorial line  
15 here and says that commercial activity has to happen in  
16 this side of the line within the United States. And  
17 that's what we don't have here.

18 I would like to --

19 JUSTICE SCALIA: What provision are you --  
20 what provision are you referring to?

21 MR. BASOMBRI: I'm pro -- referring to the  
22 first clause of the commercial activity exception, that  
23 it requires that the commercial activity be conducted,  
24 carried out in the United States. That means that  
25 within the territory of the United States. And I

1       reached that conclusion by comparing it to the third  
2       clause, which refers to commercial activity outside of  
3       the United States having a direct effect in the  
4       United States, Your Honor.

5    JUSTICE SCALIA:              I see.

6    MR. BASOMBARIO:             Now if I may just say one  
7       point about agency. There is no dispute here that if  
8       the definition in the Act applies, RP doesn't fit within  
9       it.

10          Now, this Court has recently held that we  
11       are guided by the language of the statute. I understand  
12       that arguments have been made by my colleagues and also  
13       by the Ninth Circuit that there is a difference between  
14       invocation of immunity and attribution. This is the  
15       point I want to make. Section 1604 is the invocation  
16       section. That's the section that states that certain  
17       people, those defined as the foreign state, can invoke  
18       immunity.

19          Section 1605 is an attribution section.               It  
20       says whose acts deprive you of immunity. And because  
21       foreign state is a defined term, we are limited to the  
22       limitations in the FSIA.

23          In the alternative, if this Court were to  
24       move away from the definition, I believe we would all  
25       agree that there has to be some element of control. The

1 test that this Court develops for agent has to have  
2 either the degree of control in Bancec or something  
3 lesser. But all agency law requires control, and that's  
4 where the en banc court missed the mark. They didn't  
5 require any control. And if one requires control, it  
6 has to be reversed because there was no control here.

7 If there are no pending questions, I would  
8 appreciate reserving the balance of my time for  
9 rebuttal.

10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.  
11 Mr. Kneedler.

12 ORAL ARGUMENT OF EDWIN S. KNEEDLER  
13 ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES, AS AMICUS CURIAE,  
14 SUPPORTING REVERSAL

15 MR. KNEEDLER: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it  
16 please the Court:

17 I'd like to start with the point about  
18 whether the FSIA simply incorporates due process  
19 standards, and we think it does not. It contains its  
20 own statutory terms which require interpretation.  
21 Congress did not simply incorporate the D.C. Long-Arm  
22 Statute or due process principles or phrase the -- the  
23 statute in that way. It enacted specific statutory  
24 terms. And it's --

25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So is it the based-upon

1 language or the substantial-context language?

2 MR. KNEEDLER: It's both. It's both and in  
3 the -- in the United States, which is an important point  
4 I want to make. The -- one of the reasons it's very  
5 different from just due process is because this -- the  
6 FSIA governs subject matter jurisdiction and personal  
7 jurisdiction to be sure, but based -- based upon a  
8 determination of immunity of a foreign state. And it  
9 does that by drawing, as was mentioned before, a strict  
10 territorial line that runs throughout all the  
11 exceptions. For example, the intentional -- the tort  
12 exception applies only to torts in the United States.  
13 And the property exception concerns property in the  
14 United States. And the focus of the commercial activity  
15 exception is also, at least under clause one -- well,  
16 all of them -- but clause one is commercial activity in  
17 the United States that also has a substantial  
18 connection, but the action has to be based upon, as  
19 Justice Scalia pointed out.

20 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, but how is based-upon  
21 different from the language we routinely use in specific  
22 jurisdiction cases? In other words, it just seems as  
23 though Congress, in line with its objective of treating  
24 foreign government engaging in commercial activity in  
25 the same way as they would be treated in the foreign

1      corporations case, in line with that objective, used  
2      language that's virtually synonymous with the language  
3      that we use in specific jurisdiction cases.

4                    MR. KNEEDLER:                 But -- but it -- it did it in  
5      the context of a statutory structure that is designed to  
6      protect foreign sovereign immunity and not to draw U.S.  
7      courts into what could be very sensitive international  
8      questions of having U.S. courts pass judgment on what  
9      happens in a foreign country. For --

10                  JUSTICE KENNEDY:                Well, except it did so in  
11     the context of distinguishing between commercial  
12     activity and sovereign activity.

13                  MR. KNEEDLER:                 In -- in Nelson -- actually,  
14     the pertinent paragraph in Nelson that discusses  
15     based-upon, as counsel pointed out, the Court said you  
16     start with what is the conduct that -- that the suit is  
17     based upon. And the Court said the conduct there was  
18     the conduct that took place in Saudi Arabia. And then  
19     it had a discussion that said, to be sure, there was  
20     recruitment that -- that preceded that, and that  
21     recruitment put the employee in the position to be in  
22     the hospital in Saudi Arabia where the conduct occurred.

23                  But the focus was on, as the Court said,  
24     those torts in Saudi Arabia, not the -- not the  
25     antecedent commercial activity in the United States.

1 That discussion in the Court's opinion preceded its  
2 discussion of the distinction between commercial  
3 activity and -- and sovereign activity. It had to do  
4 what -- with what is the focus of the claim. And there  
5 the Court was focusing on tort claims that happened  
6 outside the United States. And we think it's very  
7 important in this case to distinguish between tort  
8 claims and contract claims.

9 JUSTICE ALITO: What if you have a tort  
10 claim that has one element in the United States, how  
11 do -- how does a court determine whether the gravamen of  
12 the claim is in the United States or elsewhere?

13 MR. KNEEDLER: I think -- I think focusing  
14 on what -- on what the defendant's conduct is that  
15 actually caused the injury. And here, the -- the only  
16 difference between this case and Nelson is the argument  
17 that the purchase of the ticket, which is the -- by the  
18 way, the only commercial activity that was relied upon  
19 below. The Ninth Circuit says this at Phaneuf 13 and  
20 Footnote 4. Respondent is now trying to broaden that  
21 into the entire operations of the railroad which would  
22 actually be an assertion of general jurisdiction.  
23 Anything that would arise in the operation of a railroad  
24 in -- in Austria could be the subject of a suit if it  
25 was deemed to have substantial connection with the

1       United States.

2           JUSTICE KENNEDY:           If we want to give  
3       based-upon a separate substantive effect in this statute  
4       and so that it means something more substantial than  
5       mere due -- than what would suffice for due process,  
6       what -- what body of law, case law do we look to?

7           MR. KNEEDLER:           Well, I think in Nelson --

8           JUSTICE KENNEDY:           If I want to find out  
9       about based-on, what kind of cases am I supposed to  
10      read?

11          MR. KNEEDLER:           Well -- well -- and Nelson  
12       itself, I think, is very instructive on this because,  
13       first of all, the Court in Nelson did not -- did not  
14       describe what it was doing as simply applying due  
15       process standards. It was applying the statutory terms.  
16       And it -- again, it -- it focused on the particular  
17       conduct -- and this goes to Justice Alito's question as  
18       well -- it focused on the conduct that really caused the  
19       injury, which in that case was the -- were the  
20       intentional torts --

21          JUSTICE KAGAN:           So Mr. --

22          MR. KNEEDLER:           -- that happened in Saudi  
23       Arabia.

24          JUSTICE KAGAN:           In -- in my contract hypo,  
25       if the -- if the suit was a breach of contract action,

1 do you think it would be based-upon? Just a straight,  
2 like, you don't -- you didn't honor my ticket?

3 MR. KNEEDLER: On -- on a contract claim, I  
4 think that there well -- may well be a contract claim  
5 here. But I think it's important to recognize that a  
6 breach of contract claim, just because there is some  
7 connection with the United States, does not  
8 automatically -- even for due process purposes, some  
9 connection of a contract to the forum is not enough.  
10 The Court made that point in Burger King about contracts  
11 which was discussed in the -- in the Court's Walden v.  
12 Fiore case.

13 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Kneedler, before  
14 you -- before you finish, you bring up an interest in  
15 relations with other nations.

16 Do you know -- I mean, there are other  
17 nations that have similar legislation to the Foreign  
18 Sovereign Immunities Act. Do we know how this case  
19 would come out, say, in Canada, Germany, or France under  
20 similar legislation?

21 MR. KNEEDLER: The European Convention  
22 provides for jurisdiction over tort claims, which  
23 this -- which this basically is, only with respect to  
24 torts that arise in the territory, which is -- which is  
25 the case here in our own tort exception, which is an

1 important -- going back to Justice Kagan's question --  
2 an important reason why this is different from due  
3 process.

4 Tort claims under the FSIA, under -- under  
5 Exemption (5), Paragraph (a) (5), arise only when the  
6 tort occurs in the United States. And even business  
7 torts -- the House Report refers to business torts in  
8 the United States because there was a -- Congress was  
9 drawing a territorial line. And we --

10 JUSTICE BREYER: The Netherlands -- the  
11 Netherlands and Switzerland have filed a brief, haven't  
12 they, in which they said that this injury, the claim  
13 that's pursued against here, the facts that underlie it,  
14 are based upon activity that took place in Switzerland.

15 MR. KNEEDLER: Right.

16 JUSTICE BREYER: In Austria.

17 MR. KNEEDLER: Right.

18 JUSTICE BREYER: And so they wouldn't --

19 MR. KNEEDLER: Right.

20 JUSTICE BREYER: -- under their law.

21 Is there any indication -- I saw none in any  
22 of these briefs -- that there's any country in the world  
23 that would reach a different result?

24 MR. KNEEDLER: I -- as far as -- --

25 JUSTICE BREYER: They've put lawyers on both

1       sides, and I'm sure one of the lawyers would have told  
2       us if they'd found a country that would have reached --

3            MR. KNEEDLER:           And this --

4            JUSTICE BREYER:        -- result.

5            MR. KNEEDLER:         The same general point is  
6        true in the UN convention on -- on immunity with respect  
7        to tort claims --

8            JUSTICE KAGAN:        Mr. Kneedler, how about --  
9        there is a contract claim in this lawsuit, so there is  
10      a -- is a kind of warranty of fitness kind of claim.  
11      How -- how about that? Why -- if you think that the --  
12      let's assume that the contract claim, which is like you  
13      didn't honor my ticket, that there would be personal  
14      jurisdiction over, how do we separate out the warranty  
15      of habitability or fitness claim?

16           MR. KNEEDLER:        Because I think -- I think  
17      that's very parallel to what this Court confronted in  
18      the Nelson case where the -- the Court said the failure  
19      to warn -- there was a claim there too, a failure to  
20      warn about the hazard -- about the potential tort. And  
21      the -- and the court said, it -- it would not recognize  
22      jurisdiction by that sort of feint of language. You  
23      can't recharacterize something that is basically a tort  
24      abroad by claiming that there was a failure to warn --

25           JUSTICE KAGAN:        Is -- is that a typical

1       thing --

2                    MR. KNEEDLER: -- about the tort.                   We think  
3        that's true here.

4                    JUSTICE KAGAN:                   Is that a typical thing or  
5        an unusual thing to do in jurisdiction cases? In other  
6        words, to say, we're just not going to look at this  
7        claim by claim, we're going to ask about the whole gist  
8        of the lawsuit.

9                    MR. KNEEDLER:                   We think that, at least for  
10       tort claims, that, again, under our -- our position you  
11       look at the foundation of the claim, the gravamen of the  
12       claim. And applying that principle to tort claims,  
13       anyway, it's proper to look about where -- where the  
14       conduct occurred, the tortious -- the injury-causing  
15       conduct occurred rather than the injury itself?

16                  JUSTICE SCALIA:                   Can the gravamen be in more  
17       than one place?

18                  MR. KNEEDLER:                   Pardon me?

19                  JUSTICE SCALIA:                   Is -- the based-upon  
20       language, does it identify a single place, or could it  
21       be based-upon activity in -- in two jurisdictions?

22                  MR. KNEEDLER:                   Well, it -- it could be  
23       based-upon activity in two jurisdiction -- two  
24       jurisdictions. The House Report describing this talks  
25       about commercial activities occurring in whole or in

1 part in the United States.

2 JUSTICE SCALIA: But not in the airline  
3 case. You would not say that the airline case, the  
4 gravamen was the negligence in the United States and the  
5 injury when the plane landed?

6 MR. KNEEDLER: I think, depending on where  
7 the tort occurred, it may -- it may just be in the place  
8 where the -- where the negligence occurred.

9 But I do want to say that for airlines --

10 JUSTICE SCALIA: It can't be both?

11 MR. KNEEDLER: Oh, it could be -- it could  
12 be because the question under the FSIA is whether you  
13 can sue in the United States. Whether you can sue  
14 abroad is not determined by based-upon language in  
15 the -- in the FSIA.

16 But the -- with respect to airlines,  
17 those -- those are covered by the Montreal Protocol  
18 which provides a variety of jurisdictions for suits to  
19 be brought --

20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, you're not  
21 suggesting the result be different if it were a boat,  
22 are you?

23 MR. KNEEDLER: No, I --

24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well --

25 MR. KNEEDLER: No, but I -- but the

1       hypotheticals, a lot of them, the transporter have --

2                                  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:              If this was a private  
3                                  company --

4                                  MR. KNEEDLER:                   -- an airline.

5                                  JUSTICE KENNEDY:             In your hypothetical.

6                                  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:             -- would there be  
7                                  jurisdiction here?

8                                  MR. KNEEDLER:                   I'm sorry?

9                                  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:             If this were a private  
10                                 company, not the state, would there be jurisdiction  
11                                 here?

12                                 MR. KNEEDLER:                   I think probably not, but  
13                                 I -- but I think it's -- I think it would be a good idea  
14                                 for the Court not to address the due process and just  
15                                 focus on the -- on the statutory terms here, because the  
16                                 question -- question of virtual presence by purchasing a  
17                                 ticket on the Internet can arise in all sorts of ways  
18                                 for due process purposes in private cases. And -- and  
19                                 here, we have a statute to focus on.

20                                 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:         Thank you,  
21                                 Mr. Kneedler.

22                                 Mr. Fisher.

23                                 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY L. FISHER

24                                 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

25                                 MR. FISHER:                     Mr. Chief Justice, and may it

1       please the Court:

2           I'd like to start with Justice Sotomayor's  
3       question which I think has been asked a couple of other  
4       times today, which is, what would the answer be if this  
5       were a private defendant? In footnote 11 of our brief  
6       on page 33, we explain why the answer would be that  
7       there would be specific jurisdiction.

8           And in the Gibson-Dunn amicus brief at pages  
9       25 to 29 they give a fuller explanation. No response --

10          JUSTICE GINSBURG:                   Why -- why, Mr. Fisher?

11       There is one contact with the United States. A pass is  
12       bought from a travel agent in Massachusetts, a pass  
13       covering 30-odd railroads. That's all that happened in  
14       the United States. All of the relevant conduct, the  
15       tortious conduct occurred abroad.

16       I don't know of a single case where we have  
17       said specific jurisdiction can be based on a connection  
18       that had nothing to do with the injurious conduct.

19          MR. FISHER:                       But, Justice Ginsburg, I think  
20       there are plenty of cases that support the proposition  
21       that when a company markets and sells a product in a  
22       jurisdiction, that creates specific jurisdiction.  
23       That's what OBB did through its agent, RPE, is market  
24       and sell its product.

25          JUSTICE KAGAN:                   No, but not for everything.

1 I mean, let's assume this. Let's assume that I get a  
2 brochure from the Vienna Opera Company, and I send back  
3 the order form, I'd like to buy tickets, okay? Now, for  
4 sure, if the Vienna Opera Company refused to honor my  
5 tickets, I have a claim, and it arises out of the fact  
6 that they have marketed my tickets in the United States.

7 But now they honor my tickets, and I go up  
8 the stairs, and I slip in a puddle, and I injure myself.  
9 What does that have to do with the only contact that  
10 they've in the United States? I mean, at that point,  
11 you're just saying it's a but-for test, and everything  
12 would be included. But I don't know of a sensible  
13 specific jurisdiction analysis that would -- that would  
14 run like that.

15 MR. FISHER: I agree with everything you  
16 said. But this case is different because our lawsuit is  
17 based on the duty of safe passage that gave rise in that  
18 sale -- in that ticket sale. So we're suing based on  
19 the promise and the offer --

20 JUSTICE BREYER: In the -- in the Austrian  
21 case of the Opera, there is an implied warranty that the  
22 Opera is fit for the purposes -- the opera house is fit  
23 for the purposes which it serves. Okay? Same thing.  
24 Not too hard to draft that.

25 MR. FISHER: I'm not sure. And if somebody

1 did draft that, it would certainly be subject to a

2 12(b)(6) --

3 JUSTICE BREYER: What's the difference  
4 between saying that they have to warrant their product,  
5 which is an opera house, to be safe, to say that they  
6 have to warrant their trains safe for -- for passage? I  
7 can't see a difference. And it seems to me it's very  
8 normal in a contract to say that the seller of the  
9 product is implicitly warranting fitness. Isn't it?

10 MR. FISHER: Well, all I can say is in this  
11 case, we're suing on the exact warranty that gives rise  
12 from this ticket sale, Justice Breyer. And I think --

13 JUSTICE BREYER: That's -- that's the  
14 problem. I take it to go back to the questions you were  
15 asked, from your answer, you have found no case in any  
16 country where a waiver of sovereign immunity based on  
17 commercial activity supports you. And if so, what is  
18 that case? Switzerland and Britain -- or rather,  
19 Netherlands, say no. The EU Treaty says no. The  
20 UN Charter says no. And they have all these lists of  
21 language which, while not absolutely against you, leans  
22 against you.

23 So I want to know what is there, in the law  
24 of sovereign immunity particularly, that leans in your  
25 favor.

1                   MR. FISHER:                   So, Justice Breyer, to -- let  
2 me be clear about what is and is not in that brief.  
3 There are no cases that I don't think any party has  
4 cited. What the -- what that brief says is that based  
5 on the language in various conventions, that this claim  
6 wouldn't be able to be brought somewhere else. But the  
7 language in those conventions are things like arise  
8 under, based upon, and so you basically end up in the  
9 same situation as you are here which is having to decide  
10 whether this claim can be brought.

11                  Remember that brief also alleges and it  
12 actually spends more time alleging that there is no  
13 proper principle-agent relationship, which I think is --  
14 the Court has probably realized is not a very credible  
15 argument. So I think you should be careful about  
16 putting too much weight on a brief that simply cites  
17 some treaty language.

18                  But I think the point I want to make, and  
19 this -- for the hypotheticals and to bring it back to my  
20 case, and I also tie in the contract --

21                  JUSTICE BREYER:                   No. But I'm taking your  
22 answer to my question being we have none.

23                  MR. FISHER:                       We have none, and they have  
24 none. I have not found --

25                  JUSTICE BREYER:                   All right. Okay. All

1 right.

2 MR. FISHER: You can ask him on rebuttal.

3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could you tell me, your  
4 adversary claims you've been trying to change what your  
5 claim is. Is it based on the ticket sale? Or is it  
6 based on the operation of the train?

7 MR. FISHER: I think the better reading of  
8 the word "activity" in the statute for the reasons we  
9 describe in our brief is the overall integrated activity  
10 of running the railway train enterprise, which includes  
11 selling the product and delivering the product.

12 JUSTICE BREYER: I see our interests, but  
13 I'm thinking there are 190-some-odd countries in the  
14 world. Many of them do have governments that run  
15 various kinds of enterprises. When they come to the  
16 United States, perhaps not being totally conversant with  
17 American law, they might think if my commercial activity  
18 in the United States really gives rise to some problem  
19 in the United States, I expect to be sued. But where  
20 what really gives rise to it -- you see, I have to use  
21 language like that -- takes place in my country, I  
22 expect it will be my courts that will deal with it.

23 MR. FISHER: Well, I don't know why any  
24 country would have thought that about this country's  
25 law, because before this -- you know, up until this

1 point, the law in the lower courts, the D.C. Circuit and  
2 the Second Circuit, and most -- most specifically, have  
3 held that in this exact situation, there is  
4 jurisdiction.

5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, maybe --

6 MR. FISHER: And Justice Breyer --

7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- if would've  
8 read -- if they had read our opinion in Nelson, that  
9 would have given them a good inclination to read  
10 sovereign immunity the way Justice Breyer suggests.

11 MR. FISHER: No. I'm glad you asked about  
12 Nelson, Mr. Chief Justice, because the paragraph in  
13 Nelson that Mr. Kneedler is referring to is  
14 distinguishing sovereign activity from commercial  
15 activity. The Court in Nelson did not have before it  
16 and was not concerned with the geographic nexus, and you  
17 know that because in that paragraph where it lists the  
18 things upon which the Nelsons' claim is not truly based,  
19 it lists not only the recruitment in the United States  
20 but the actual employment in Saudi Arabia.

21 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, he has a paragraph in  
22 Nelson, one sentence of which helps you, that he says  
23 the Nelsons -- you know, they negotiated with the  
24 Nelsons in the United States. They entered into a  
25 contract in the United States. The Nelsons are heard

1       aborad. I take it that's the basis of it, and this  
2       helps you.

3                 But he says before even taking each of the  
4       Nelsons' allegations about the recruitment and  
5       employment is true, those facts entitle the Nelsons to  
6       nothing under their theory of the case, which isn't  
7       contract. But, he goes on to say, it's these torts,  
8       which happened in the hospital abroad and not the  
9       arguably commercial activities that preceded their  
10      commission that formed the basis for the Nelsons' suit.

11                MR. FISHER:                   So --

12                JUSTICE BREYER:               The basis for. You see.

13       And so --

14                MR. FISHER:                   Justice Breyer --

15                JUSTICE BREYER:               -- that's why I'm thinking  
16       it does not help you.

17                MR. FISHER:                   When the Court said the  
18       arguable commercial activities that preceded it, they  
19       were talking not only about the recruitment in the  
20       United States but also the employment itself in Saudi  
21       Arabia. And they were distinguishing that from the  
22       police activity of seizing somebody and holding him in  
23       jail, which was what the case was really about which  
24       were sovereign activities.

25                So the Court in Nelson -- Mr. Chief Justice,

1 to be clear, I'm not saying Nelson supports me. I think  
2 Nelson simply doesn't answer this question because you  
3 were concerned in that case with sovereign versus  
4 commercial, not geographic nexus.

5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So in line with the  
6 discussion we had earlier about specific jurisdiction,  
7 is your argument that general jurisdiction is enough to  
8 support based-upon under the statute?

9 MR. FISHER: No, Your Honor. I --

10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I thought you  
11 talked about just all of the different commercial  
12 activities that the Austrian airline engaged in in the  
13 United States. And if it's all of the different  
14 commercial activities, that sounds like general  
15 jurisdiction, not the specific jurisdiction.

16 MR. FISHER: No. I think OBB is subject to  
17 jurisdiction under the -- or -- I'm sorry, I should say  
18 does not have sovereign immunity under the FSIA for its  
19 train operation of selling tickets and getting people  
20 rides on the trains. It wouldn't be subject to  
21 jurisdiction if it had some -- if it had a mining  
22 enterprise on the side or something else that didn't  
23 even touch the United States.

24 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, suppose --

25 MR. FISHER: So the activity --

1                   JUSTICE KAGAN:           Yes. But in point of fact,  
2 that's all OBB does. So, effectively, your argument is  
3 an argument that OBB is subject to jurisdiction in a  
4 general jurisdiction kind of way with respect to  
5 everything that they do. And, you know, I think what  
6 the Chief Justice is suggesting is, like, that seems  
7 wrong.

8                   MR. FISHER:               Well, let me say two things,  
9 Justice Kagan.

10                  (Laughter.)

11                  MR. FISHER:               Thank you. I think that is the  
12 fairest reading of the statute, and Mr. Kneedler was  
13 talking about the House Report. One of the examples in  
14 the House Report of a commercial activity was running an  
15 airline. It's hard to distinguish running an airline  
16 from running a train system.

17                  JUSTICE ALITO:           Well, suppose --

18                  MR. FISHER:               So the terms of the statute do  
19 cover that.

20                  If -- Justice Alito, may I -- may I just say  
21 one more thing to Justice Kagan?

22                  JUSTICE ALITO:           Sure. Finish your answer.

23                  MR. FISHER:               Which is if you didn't agree  
24 that the term "commercial activity" covered the entire  
25 enterprise, then you would ask the question whether the

1       activity of selling tickets is enough to create a  
2       based-upon argument in a specific jurisdiction since we  
3       went back to the conversation we've been having.

4                                  JUSTICE ALITO:              Suppose Ms. Sachs was  
5       Australian, and she bought this ticket on the Internet  
6       in Australia.   Would you say that there would be no  
7       sovereign immunity in the suit in the United States?

8                                  MR. FISHER:                 Well, there wouldn't  
9       necessarily be sovereign -- there may not be sovereign  
10      immunity under the terms of the Act.   But obviously,  
11      there would be a number of reasons why that case  
12      couldn't be brought --

13                                 JUSTICE ALITO:               But there would be -- there  
14      would be -- there would not be immunity because it was  
15      based on the running of the railroad.

16                                 MR. FISHER:                 Right.   Which -- which -- on  
17      the -- taking everything else the same, has substantial  
18      contact to the United States.   But all the -- all we're  
19      talking about in this case is immunity.   Section 1330,  
20      where it has jurisdiction over foreign states,  
21      has -- says that that jurisdiction has to be in  
22      personam.   And obviously, that would carry with it the  
23      requirements for in personam jurisdiction which would  
24      require a contact in this country.

25                                 And this is one thing I want to make sure,

1      is the Court understands to bring us back to the  
2      hypotheticals we were talking about earlier and to tie  
3      in the contract hypothetical, it's important for the  
4      Court to understand there are all manner of cases where  
5      a duty is created in this country by way of a foreign  
6      state's commercial activities, and then injuries or  
7      breaches occur abroad. In fact, this is rather the  
8      oddball case.

9                The more typical case is a high-finance deal  
10       like the bonds case in the Weltover case, other kinds of  
11       international finance and loans. There are many  
12       employment cases where United States citizens sign an  
13       employment contract or are lured abroad, study abroad  
14       programs in the educational sphere, all kinds of  
15       situations where a duty is created in this country, but  
16       then all of the events that the lawsuit turns out to be  
17       about happen abroad.

18               JUSTICE KAGAN:                   Well, if --

19               MR. FISHER:                       If that's the case --

20               JUSTICE GINSBURG:               Mr. Fisher, you -- you  
21       recognize -- I think you recognized in your brief that  
22       this -- you can call it a question of first impression.  
23       You -- you said, I believe, based on -- the meaning of  
24       based-on in this context is an open question.

25               And if it is an open question, why should we

1 allow a foreign carrier to be sued in the United States  
2 for acts or omissions overseas -- the negligent conduct  
3 occurred overseas -- when the only link, the single link  
4 is a ticket, a pass, purchased from a -- a travel agent  
5 in the United States?

6 MR. FISHER: For all the reasons I was just  
7 saying, Justice Ginsburg, because it is utterly common  
8 for duties to be created in this country -- here, the  
9 duty of safe passage and of utmost care -- and then the  
10 breach to occur abroad.

11 My -- my friend on the other side was  
12 correct to say this case is indistinguishable from  
13 contract cases. There are -- there are all kinds of  
14 cases where duties are created in this country and then  
15 breached abroad.

16 JUSTICE KAGAN: But if that's true --

17 MR. FISHER: The lower courts have always  
18 held that the FSIA --

19 JUSTICE KAGAN: If that's true, I don't  
20 understand why you answered my hypothetical question the  
21 way you did, because in my hypothetical question I  
22 thought you said that there would not be jurisdiction to  
23 sue in the United States when I slip and fall in Vienna.

24 And -- but you could make the same argument.  
25 Well, there was a duty created in the United States, and

1       that's what I'm suing on.

2            MR. FISHER:           I think when I answered your  
3       question I was imagining there wasn't a duty created.  
4       Maybe as Justice Breyer amended the hypothetical, there  
5       might be --

6            JUSTICE KAGAN:       Well, there's -- I mean, the  
7       only thing that's happened in the United States is that  
8       I've purchased a ticket there. That's -- that's what  
9       I've done.

10          MR. FISHER:           Right.

11          JUSTICE KAGAN:       So I take it that your  
12       argument is that purchase of a ticket gives rise to a  
13       duty which is then violated when I slip and fall in  
14       another country.

15          MR. FISHER:           I would say if the plaintiff  
16       alleges that in the lawsuit, then there would not be  
17       sovereign immunity. And then Justice Alito's -- I think  
18       as he was saying earlier, you would have a -- perhaps a  
19       very strong 12(b)(6) argument that there's no such State  
20       law claim that actually gave rise in that context.

21          CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:   If -- if you get on  
22       the train in Vienna, and you buy your ticket in Vienna  
23       and you get on the train in Vienna, there is on the  
24       train operator some duty of care, isn't there?

25           Without regard to -- in other words, there's

1       nothing special about buying a ticket in the  
2       United States that gives rise to a unique duty of care  
3       that's any different from the duty of care that the  
4       railroad owes its passengers in Austria.

5                    MR. FISHER:           I think that's right, Mr. Chief  
6       Justice, but -- as long as you're talking about buying a  
7       ticket one place to the other. But of course that's  
8       true of any seller of any product that they -- that they  
9       stand -- you know, they offer the same thing depending  
10      on where you buy it.

11                  But the critical thing is where did they  
12      sell their ticket? They reached out to this country --  
13      and it is worth answering your question with this  
14      important point, which is the product that they sold to  
15      Ms. Sachs is not available to Austrian citizens. This  
16      is a specially-tailored product available only --

17                  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:       I understand. But  
18      there's nothing unique about the standard of care based  
19      upon whether it's a Eurail Pass or something else, is  
20      there?

21                  I'm just trying to suggest that you're  
22      putting an awful lot of weight on the standard of care  
23      created by the purchase of the ticket. And -- and  
24      that's no different here or whether the ticket was  
25      purchased in -- in Austria.

1           MR. FISHER:                 It would --

2           CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:         It makes no  
3           difference to what standard of care she would allege if  
4           there were some other basis for jurisdiction in the  
5           United States?

6           MR. FISHER:                 That might be correct, but it  
7           is important not to lose sight of the fact that she  
8           didn't buy her ticket there. OBB reached out into this  
9           forum.

10          And just going back to this Court's ordinary  
11          due process cases, when a business purposefully avails  
12          itself of the protections and the opportunities of a  
13          particular jurisdiction --

14          JUSTICE GINSBURG:                 Mr. Fisher, the  
15          purposefully-availed-of test relates to specific  
16          jurisdiction, and there has to be an instant connecting.  
17          If there is that connection, then you must have, in  
18          addition, purposefully-availed-of.

19          But purposefully-availed-of, standing alone,  
20          doesn't give you general jurisdiction, and it doesn't  
21          give you specific jurisdiction.

22          MR. FISHER:                 No. Fair enough. But you have  
23          to have a contact, and that's the substantial contact  
24          test in this -- in this case --

25          JUSTICE KAGAN:                 But you also have to have a

1       relationship.

2                    MR. FISHER:           And you have to have a  
3       relationship, which we do, because we purchased it here.

4                    JUSTICE KAGAN:       Well, let's say that I don't  
5       accept that argument, okay? Let's just for a moment  
6       assume that on a straight negligence claim, the idea  
7       that a negligence claim arising from an accident in  
8       Austria arises -- let's say I think it arises from the  
9       accident in Austria. It does not arise from the  
10      purchase of a ticket in the United States, okay?

11                  MR. FISHER:           Yeah.

12                  JUSTICE KAGAN:       Now, I guess there's still a  
13      question as to whether your warranty claims ought to be  
14      treated differently. And I take it what Mr. Kneedler  
15      has said about that is, no, they shouldn't be, that's  
16      just fancy pleading, it's just a way of converting a  
17      negligence claim into a contract claim. It's the same  
18      kind of thing that happened in Nelson that we refused to  
19      allow. Why isn't that right?

20                  MR. FISHER:           It's not right because what you  
21      were worried about in Nelson is artful pleading to get  
22      around true sovereign immunity; in other words, to  
23      challenge sovereign acts dressed up as something else.

24                  Here there's no allegation that we're  
25      challenging sovereign acts. Everybody agrees we're

1 challenging commercial acts. There's only the  
2 geographic nexus question. So we can plead a tort  
3 however we like subject to Rule 12(b)(6), which they can  
4 make on remand.

5 And, Mr. Chief Justice, maybe I could turn  
6 back to one of yours questions, because I think it  
7 further highlights the difficulty with the other side's  
8 test.

9 It has to be enough for a duty to create a  
10 cause of action, we say, because otherwise you're left  
11 with this gravamen test. And either -- gravamen test  
12 has to mean one of two things: Either it has to mean  
13 that only one particular place can be the gravamen,  
14 which is the way I understood it from their briefing.  
15 But as the Court, I think, is figuring out from this  
16 argument, you get into all heaps of troubles with  
17 contracts, employment, all kinds of other things where  
18 the injuries occur abroad, and how on earth is the Court  
19 to determine where the gravamen is.

20 On the other hand, if gravamen is sort of a  
21 grava-person's test so that you can have many multiple  
22 places where a claim can be brought, then I'm at a loss  
23 to understand how it's any improvement over the one  
24 element --

25 JUSTICE BREYER: How does it work with a

1 domestic contract, an ordinary domestic contract entered  
2 into in Nevada, and the breach of the contract, which  
3 consisted of a failure, for example, to deliver goods to  
4 San Francisco, took place in California, and the lawsuit  
5 is brought in Nevada?

6                   How does that work?                   They move -- well, how  
7                   does it happen?

8                   MR. FISHER:                   Under due process, you'd have  
9 jurisdiction in Nevada.

10                  JUSTICE BREYER:                   I know that, but I mean  
11 where does the -- where does the --

12                  MR. FISHER:                   The gravamen?

13                  JUSTICE BREYER:                   Yeah, yeah. Does that not  
14 come up as to what law applies, as to a factor in forum  
15 non conveniens.

16                  MR. FISHER:                   No, it --

17                  JUSTICE BREYER:                   No, it doesn't? How do you  
18 decide what law applies? The contract doesn't say.

19                  MR. FISHER:                   The most -- there's a most  
20 significant relationship --

21                  JUSTICE BREYER:                   Ah. Most significant  
22 relationship. I see.

23                  MR. FISHER:                   -- every State, it says.

24                  JUSTICE BREYER:                   And does it matter whether  
25 it's -- is it to the formation of the contract or is it

1 to the breach?

2 MR. FISHER: I think it's sometimes one and  
3 sometimes the other, Justice Breyer.

4 JUSTICE BREYER: And what's the difference  
5 whether it's the one or the other?

6 MR. FISHER: Pardon me?

7 JUSTICE BREYER: What's the difference?

8 MR. FISHER: It depends --

9 JUSTICE BREYER: I mean how does the Court  
10 decide?

11 MR. FISHER: It depends --

12 JUSTICE BREYER: I'm -- I'm simply pointing  
13 out that these kinds of problems are not unique to the  
14 international context.

15 MR. FISHER: No, I think --

16 JUSTICE BREYER: They arise in many  
17 different legal circumstances, and courts have to decide  
18 what is the gravamen, and sometimes that's difficult and  
19 sometimes it's not.

20 MR. FISHER: Well --

21 JUSTICE BREYER: Am I right about that?

22 MR. FISHER: I've never seen this term used  
23 in the case law. And I think the other side was correct  
24 when they answered --

25 JUSTICE BREYER: -- the weight of the -- I

1    don't know. You're the one -- I'm not very  
2    knowledgeable, and I -- I tend to believe you're more  
3    knowledgeable. Therefore, I'm asking you the question.

4                    MR. FISHER:                Well, all I can do is honestly  
5    answer that I've never seen this test used in any choice  
6    of law analysis.

7                    JUSTICE GINSBURG:            If we're dealing --

8                    MR. FISHER:                I will add that --

9                    JUSTICE GINSBURG:            If we're dealing with  
10   choice of law, is -- is there any serious question of  
11   what law would govern the adequacy of OBB's boarding  
12   protocol, or their platform design? Would that be any  
13   law other than Austria?

14                  MR. FISHER:                Well, the Ninth Circuit held  
15   that California law applies in this case, and OBB has  
16   never -- has not challenged that holding. So as the  
17   case comes to this Court, California law applies for  
18   purposes of the one element --

19                  JUSTICE GINSBURG:            And I'm -- I'm asking  
20   you. Never mind what the California court said.

21                  We have an accident in Austria, and it's  
22   based on -- the allegation is the boarding protocol was  
23   negligently designed, or the platform, the space between  
24   the train and the platform, negligently designed.

25                  What law would govern whether that platform

1      was negligently designed, whether the boarding protocol,  
2      operating protocol was negligent?

3                            MR. FISHER:                  In all candor, Justice  
4      Ginsburg, there'd be a pretty good argument that Austria  
5      law should apply. And it is important for the Court to  
6      understand that simply holding that a suit under the  
7      FSIA can be brought in this country does not mean that  
8      U.S. law applies. There's a separate choice of law  
9      analysis that can be made. And so OBB had the  
10     opportunity to make choice of law arguments and has  
11     decided not to.

12                        But remember, they can do choice of law  
13      analysis not only in terms of ordinary common law  
14      principles that might apply in a court, but there's a  
15      number of ways that a defendant in OBB's position can  
16      protect itself in a case like this.

17                        First of all, they can put a choice of law  
18      provision in the ticket, or in the contract, or whatever  
19      might be at issue.

20                        Second of all, even as to forum, forum  
21      selection clauses can be put into tickets like this, and  
22      contracts, and in fact they are. As the United States  
23      told the Court at the cert stage of this case, all of  
24      these tickets now are governed by a forum selection  
25      clause provision, so you'll never see a case like this

1 again, not only in the railroad context, but even in the  
2 airline industry.

3 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And that -- and that  
4 works, even though it's an adhesion contract, and it's  
5 small print --

6 MR. FISHER: Under Carnival Cruise Lines,  
7 this Court's decision, those kinds of forum selection  
8 clauses are perfectly enforceable.

9 JUSTICE KENNEDY: That -- that was an  
10 admiralty case, though.

11 MR. FISHER: Well, I don't know why it would  
12 be different in this context, Justice Kennedy.  
13 Certainly the government says that these are all  
14 governed by forum selection clauses now. We think they  
15 are, too.

16 So what you're really deciding in this case,  
17 if I could end where perhaps I began, is you're not  
18 deciding transportation in this case, because all  
19 transportation cases are now covered by conventions and  
20 forum selection causes. What you're really deciding is  
21 what the law should be in the mainstream FSIA cases,  
22 like finance, like contracts. That's why Gibson-Dunn  
23 has filed a case on behalf of a -- of a large hedge fund  
24 that says, we do business all the time with foreign  
25 sovereigns and we're very worried that if the Court

1 adopts this gravamen based-upon, we will not be able to  
2 enforce contracts and duties in this country that have  
3 given rise under negotiations in this country and then  
4 are breached abroad.

5 Employment situations, like the hypothetical  
6 we give in our brief, where a United States citizen is  
7 hired as an engineer to go do oil and gas exploration  
8 and then something happens abroad.

9 Those cases have always been brought in this  
10 country. And if this Court adopts the gravamen test,  
11 what you'll be saying is the courts now have some  
12 amorphous test that would seem, especially if there is  
13 only a single gravamen, that would seem to bounce all of  
14 these cases out of the United States courts, which would  
15 be dramatically --

16 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, suppose -- suppose  
17 the Court simply said, buying a ticket from an agent in  
18 the United States is not enough, period. We don't adopt  
19 any gravamen. The question is, what does based-on mean.  
20 And the Court could say based-on is not based-on if all  
21 that happened in the United States is the purchase of  
22 the ticket. We don't have to buy any gravamen or  
23 anything else.

24 MR. FISHER: Well, I think there is two  
25 reasons why you couldn't just limit it to that,

1      Justice Ginsburg. First, as a legal matter, our claim  
2      depends on the duty that arose when that ticket's  
3      purchase was made. And I don't see any legal way to  
4      distinguish duties that arose in a ticket sale from  
5      other kinds of duties that arise and all kinds of other  
6      marketing and contract settings.

7                And second of all, just as a matter of  
8      common sense, remember -- let's go back to where we  
9      began -- this is a commercial activity exception. If  
10     they weren't selling tickets, it wouldn't even be  
11     commercial to begin with. So it would be a highly odd  
12     holding to say that the one thing that makes this  
13     commercial is what prevents it from being brought in the  
14     United States.

15               JUSTICE GINSBURG:                    What makes it commercial  
16     is it's a railroad doing the same thing a private  
17     railroad would do. It's in -- its business is operating  
18     a railroad.

19               MR. FISHER:                          That's right, Justice Ginsburg.  
20     And if you want us to ask the question in terms of  
21     whether a private company would be subject to  
22     jurisdiction under the same settings here, at least all  
23     you have to hold is that OBB should be in the same shoes  
24     as a private company.

25               Now, we say in our brief and in the Gibson

1 brief in more detail, why due process wouldn't stand in  
2 the way of jurisdiction there. But if you have any  
3 doubt about that, you can note that OBB has made a  
4 personal jurisdiction argument in the district court  
5 that the district court never reached. And so that is  
6 available on remand.

7 The only thing before this Court is  
8 sovereign immunity and whether OBB is entitled to  
9 sovereign immunity for commercial acts in this country  
10 and the teeth of a congressional statute that says in  
11 the declaration of purpose in Section 1602 that foreign  
12 states doing commercial activities in this country  
13 should not be entitled to sovereign immunity.

14 And then in Section 1606 says:                           What we want  
15 to do is --

16 JUSTICE BREYER:                                   And we say, look, did --  
17 they're -- your exact words.

18 MR. FISHER:                                   Pardon me?

19 JUSTICE BREYER:                                   Are they liable for  
20 activity that took place in this country? They are  
21 liable for the breach of the contract. The breach of  
22 the contract took place in Austria.

23 MR. FISHER:                                   No.

24 JUSTICE BREYER:                                   End of case.

25 MR. FISHER:                                   No.

1 JUSTICE BREYER: Why not?

2 MR. FISHER: Because -- because what the  
3 definition of in the United States, Justice Breyer, and  
4 this is sub (D) of 1603(c), says that -- I'm sorry, it's  
5 sub -- sub (E) of 1603(c) says that "in the  
6 United States" is defined as substantial contact with  
7 the United States. And so that can occur in whole or in  
8 part in this country, and in part -- I'm sorry, in part  
9 includes the ticket sale.

10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

11 Mr. Basombrio, you have three minutes  
12 remaining.

13 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF MR. BASOMBARIO

14 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

15 MR. BASOMBARIO: Thank you, Mr. Chief  
16 Justice, and may it please the Court:

17 Much of our discussion today has been in  
18 separating the torts from the contractual claims here in  
19 this case, implied warranty claims. Let me tell you why  
20 I believe it's a bad idea to split claims on causes of  
21 action. This Court decided recently a case called  
22 Pimentel in which the Republic of the Philippines had  
23 sovereign immunity. But there were also a number of  
24 other defendants that did not enjoy sovereign immunity.  
25 And this Court, taking into consideration important

1 issues such as international comity, decided that under  
2 Rule 19, the entire lawsuit had to be dismissed,  
3 including as to nonsovereign entities, in order to give  
4 full effect to the sovereign immunity of the Republic of  
5 the Philippines.

6 In light of that holding, it would make  
7 little sense that when the defendant has the right to  
8 invoke immunity, that we would split the causes of  
9 action so that some of them would proceed in Austria and  
10 some of them would proceed in the United States.

11 JUSTICE ALITO: Are you suggesting the  
12 based-upon determination is not done on a claim-by-claim  
13 basis, it's -- you look at the entire complaint?

14 MR. BASOMBRIO: That's why --

15 JUSTICE ALITO: Find the gravamen of the  
16 entire complaint?

17 MR. BASOMBRIO: Yes, exactly, Your Honor.

18 And the circuit courts and the State courts have all  
19 understood what gravamen means. They know what it  
20 means. And if we just took anybody off the street here  
21 and we asked them, why is the Respondent suing, each  
22 person would say, because she was injured in a terrible  
23 accident in Austria.

24 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, what if the only claim  
25 were the breach of warranty claim?

1           MR. BASOMBRIOS:         Then we would have to ask  
2 where did the breach occur. As in Justice Kagan's  
3 question, I would answer, if the breach occurred in  
4 Austria, then the claim would arise in Austria.

5           Now, the warranty, in terms of the duty of  
6 care, there is no duty of care until she arrives at the  
7 station and tries to board that train. And even if she  
8 didn't have a ticket at all, the record establishes that  
9 we would still owe her a duty of care.

10          JUSTICE ALITO:         What if she also had, in  
11 addition to the claims she's asserted, a conventional  
12 breach of contract claim? She said that when they --  
13 when she tried to get on the train, they said no, your  
14 Eurail Pass doesn't let you get on free, you have to pay  
15 an additional amount?

16          MR. BASOMBRIOS:        That would have said --

17          JUSTICE ALITO:         We look to the gravamen of  
18 the whole thing and we say, well, the tort claims are in  
19 Austria and therefore she can't bring this breach of  
20 contract claim in the United States?

21          MR. BASOMBRIOS:        Well, if she had been -- if  
22 she had been hurt and in addition to that, they would  
23 have told her --

24          JUSTICE ALITO:         Well, exactly what happened  
25 here, plus she said they made me pay extra.

1                   MR. BASOMBARIO:           Then the gravamen would  
2       still be Austria because that's where all those events  
3       took place.

4                   CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:           Thank you, counsel.  
5       The case is submitted.

6                   (Whereupon, at 11:05 a.m., the case in the  
7       above-entitled matter was submitted.)

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